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RACIAL RELEASES,
INVOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS,
AND EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL
Donna E. Young*
I. INTRODUCTION
People of color in the United States have a complicated relation-
ship with the world of work. For us, work has signified indentured
servitude, slavery, mob violence, exploitation, drudgery, exhaustion,
and ill-health. On the job, we have been subjected to long arduous
hours, poor working conditions, and demeaning tasks. We have been
segregated, oppressed, threatened, raped, injured, and killed. And
throughout most of U.S. history, we have endured this mistreatment
politically powerless and without meaningful legal protection.
But, we continue to work. We continue to find meaning in the
jobs that we do and continue to recognize that work offers us the
means for personal, social, and economic growth. It provides us with
a sense of pride and identity. There is no doubt that "[w]ork is one
of the most fundamental aspects in a person's life, providing the in-
dividual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a
contributory role in society. A person's employment is an essential
component of his or her sense of identity, self-worth and emotional
well-being."' The ability to work and the work that one does are
* Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. I
would like to thank Dianne Avery, Mark Barenberg, Thomas Carbonneau, J.
Stephen Clark, Kimberle Crenshaw, Darren Cunningham, Martha Fineman,
Scott Goodspeed, Peter Halewood, Elizabeth Iglesias, Timothy Lytton, Lisa
Natoli, Nancy Ota, Donna Parent, James G. Pope, Laura Shore, and Hilary Sil-
ver for their helpful comments, suggestions, and support. Special thanks to
Isaac Young. Earlier drafts of this Article were presented at the Fourth Annual
Northeastern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, San Juan, Puerto
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vital to one's relationship with society.2 Through work one is able to
engage in fundamental civic duties. Moreover, work enables us to
assert our personal identity which is profoundly connected to our
employment. In order to be recognized for the unique human beings
that each of us are, we must work in order to "externalize [our] tal-
ents" and our "creative capacities" in the world.4 Something more
than economic harm results when one's capacity to externalize one's
talents in work is impeded. The impediment often leads to psychic
harm and may threaten our personhood. 5 Therefore, perhaps as im-
portant as work is to one's identity and social role, is the manner in
which one's employment comes to an end.6
Consequently, job termination has been called the "capital pun-
ishment" of employment relations. As a form of discipline, its
for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the School of Law, Columbia
University.
1. Machtinger v. HOJ Indus. Ltd., [1992] S.C.R. 986, 1002 (Can.) (quot-
ing Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] S.C.R. 313,
368 (Can.)).
2. See David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation
of Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 119, 129-30 (1988). According to Gregory:
Work, or at least the aspiration to work, is ubiquitous. Work perme-
ates, and is often nearly synonymous with, much of both individual
and social life. The individual person is dignified by work; the com-
munity is enriched by work. Society stands condemned by failure to
provide meaningful work.... Work helps us become more fully hu-
man.
Id.; see also J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights
to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 339 (1974) (recognizing the severe
economic consequences of employment insecurity).
3. See Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50
VAND. L. REv. 919, 922-23 (1997) (exploring whether the poor "might have a
social duty to contribute their talents and energies to the greater social good
despite their lack of income" and arguing that the fulfillment of duties as well
as access to rights "are necessary components of one's full membership in a
community").
4. Drucilla Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique of Employment
at Will, 10 CARDOzo L. REv. 1575, 1620 (1989); see also id. at 1614 (ex-
plaining further that "[w]hen our ability to externalize our capacities is chal-
lenged, so is our personhood").
5. See id. at 1614-15.
6. See Machtinger v. HOJ Indus. Ltd., [1992] S.C.R. 986, 1002 (Can.).
7. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 910 (4th ed. 1998) (explaining that the "loss of em-
ployment means not only loss of income but in our culture is often equated
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seriousness is unparalleled. Dismissal affects a person's economic,
emotional, and physical health in ways unparalleled by less drastic
forms of discipline or transitory interruptions of work. Not only does
dismissal have immediate financial consequences for the discharged
worker, it also has an economic impact into the future, affecting "ac-
crued seniority... accessibility to future jobs as well as entitlement
to government benefits such as unemployment insurance." s The loss
of one's job is felt not only by the individual worker, but by mem-
bers of his or her family and the community.9 Job termination is
particularly distressing for those whose employment offers the only
source of income for the family. If the termination is the result of
factors other than an employee's conduct or performance, the loss
can be devastating.' 0 Unlike cases in which employment probation
or suspension follow some form of worker misbehavior, involuntary
separations" may take place even absent any fault on the part of the
with loss of character and identity as well").
8. Machtinger, [1992] S.C.RI at 991 (quoting Katherine Swinton, Contract
Law and the Emplovyment Relationship: The Proper Forum for Reform, in
STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 357, 360-61 (Barry J. Reiter & John Swan eds.,
1980)).
9. For example, the loss of a job may necessitate relocation, place burdens
on a spouse and children, etc. If one is a single parent or the sole wage earner
in the family, the loss of a job can create serious financial pressures and risks
to the family's health and integrity. Furthermore, dismissal of a worker has
implications for employers too. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Dutv to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1816, 1834 (1980) (pointing out that "an arbitrary discharge
may mean a waste of training, continuity, and expertise").
10. See id. at 1833-34 (arguing that a loss of one's job leads to embarrass-
ment and loss of status).
11. I have chosen to use the terms involuntary "separation," "dismissal," or
"discharge" in order to avoid confusion with the terms "unjust/unfair" or
"wrongful" discharge. The latter terms define a narrower set of circumstances
in which the courts have recognized tort or contractual exceptions to the at-will
doctrine, or in which collective bargaining agreements require employer justi-
fication for employee dismissals. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 386-87 (Conn. 1980) (recognizing a common-law cause of
action in tort for the discharge of an at-will employee "if the former employee
can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose im-
propriety is derived from some important violation of public policy"). My use
of the term involuntary separation is meant to be broader in scope in order to
encompass a common-sense approach that covers dismissals that would typi-
cally be thought of as unfair, but for which public policy or other exceptions to
the at-will doctrine are probably unavailable.
January 2001]
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employee. The loss is all the more bitter if an employee perceives it
to be due not to any fault or misdeed on her part, but rather to un-
specified reasons having nothing to do with performance, attitude,
behavior, or economic necessity.'
2
Given the centrality of work in people's lives, it may come as a
surprise to those not familiar with U.S. employment law that only re-
cently has the law provided protections against the most blatantly
unjust forms of summary discharge of employees. 13 Even so, many
types of involuntary discharge are left free from judicial scrutiny.
For example, in addition to dismissals that are patently justified, such
as those resulting from employee misdeeds or layoffs for economic
reasons, there are dismissals not predicated upon employee culpabil-
ity or financial exigency. So long as the employee and employer
have entered into an agreement in which no set period of employ-
ment has been specified, the employee can be dismissed at will, for
no reason, and without notice. This common-law rule, the employ-
ment at-will doctrine,' 4 has been in force for over a century and
12. See Note, supra note 9, at 1834 (stating that the risks of unemployment
are disproportionately felt by employees, and there is little deterrence for em-
ployers to avoid unjust dismissal since any costs involved can be passed on to
consumers).
13. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994)
(prohibiting an employer from discharging an employee for union activities);
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (pro-
tecting employees from discriminatory dismissals based on age); Rehabilita-
tion Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 710-796 (1994) (protecting the disabled from discrimi-
natory discharge); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)
(prohibiting discharges based on race, color, religion, national origin, and sex);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)
(protecting the disabled from discriminatory discharge).
14. See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
272 (Albany, N.Y., John D. Parsons, Jr. 1877). Wood explains that employ-
ment at-will is a rebuttable presumption:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof ... [I]t
is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either
party ....
Id.; see also Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 920 (N.Y. 1987)
(holding that "absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employ-
ment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by
either party").
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continues to be the basis of state and federal employment laws which
regulate the workplace.
In this Article, I address what I believe to be fundamental prob-
lems with the at-will doctrine's foundation in a theory of formal
equality and its collaborative role in the subordination of women and
people of color. Borrowing from competing jurisprudential models
of equality and job security, I will offer a legislative alternative to at-
will employment requiring employers to provide notice of dismissal
or pay in lieu of notice. In doing so, I am entering a lively and in-
creasingly heated debate about the validity of the employment at-will
doctrine. I place myself firmly on the side of the critics. However, I
differ from my fellow critics in several fundamental ways. First, I
have chosen to place people of color at the center of my analysis; up
to now they have been relegated to the margins of the academic dia-
logue on employment at-will. This is perplexing since intuition sug-
gests and recent studies confirm that people of color are much more
likely to be discharged from employment than Whites. I argue that
the employment at-will doctrine works in tandem with ineffectual
antidiscrimination laws to facilitate these dismissals by shielding
employers from having to justify the terminations. Second, I contend
that placing people of color at the center of the analysis makes ap-
parent the shortcomings of a pure "just-cause" scheme that employ-
ment at-will critics have presented as an alternative to the at-will pre-
sumption. Studies have found that in the federal employment sector
in which just-cause requirements are the norm, people of color are
still more likely than Whites to be involuntarily dismissed. Third, I
argue that the United States stands virtually alone among Western
industrialized nations in its failure to furnish its workers adequate job
security. I argue that American lawmakers should emulate Canada's
employment regulation scheme as a model for law reform. Fourth, I
offer my solution which is that the law ought to require mandatory
notice or pay in lieu of notice; I argue that a minimum notice re-
quirement would have the effect of compensating those victims of
discriminatory discharge who cannot rely on current antidiscrimina-
tion laws to protect them. In sum, I wish to challenge commonly
held notions about the appropriate legal regulation of the employ-
ment relationship in the context of the social and economic inequal-
ity which currently permeates the American workplace.
January 2001]
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II. THE CRITIQUE IN BPEF
In regulating the workplace, government must try to balance
various interests, including the employer's interest in managing its
enterprise in ways that maximize profit or improve service; the em-
ployee's interest in obtaining favorable terms and conditions of em-
ployment; and the public's interest in the establishment of minimum
standards in order to maintain harmonious industrial relations. Not
surprisingly, however, debates about the extent to which law should
interfere in the employment relationship persist. Be that as it may,
the cornerstone of United States employment law continues to be the
employment at-will doctrine, a common-law invention the purpose
of which is to ensure that either the employer or employee engaged
in a labor contract of indefinite duration may quit the contract at any
time, for any reason, without notice. On its own terms, the doctrine
imposes an approach to employment that posits that employer and
employee are formally equal. That is, each party is free to leave the
employment relationship at any time, thereby promoting equality, in-
dividual autonomy, freedom of contract, and efficiency. The parties
are presumed to enter the employment contract willingly and equally
able to negotiate the terms of the agreement. The doctrine, therefore,
presumes symmetry in bargaining power between worker and em-
ployer, equal knowledge about the rights and responsibilities inher-
ent in the employment relationship, and the parties' free choice in
entering into an employment agreement. 15 Since the parties are pre-
sumptively equal, the law must act neutrally and refrain from ob-
structing the ability of the parties to end the employment relationship
at their will. In the United States, by far the most common
15. See Katherine Swinton, Contract Law and the Employment Relation-
ship: The Proper Forum for Reform, in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAw 357, 363
(Barry J. Reiter & John Swan eds., 1980). Swinton observed that
the terms of the employment contract rarely result from an exercise of
free bargaining power in the way that the paradigm commercial ex-
change between two traders does. Individual employees on the whole
lack both the bargaining power and the information necessary to
achieve more favourable contract provisions than those offered by the
employer, particularly with regard to tenure.
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employment arrangement is at-will, involving an indefinite term in
which there is no written contract.'
6
Superimposed upon the at-will employment relationship is the
notion of managerial prerogative or discretion-that is, the right of
management to do whatever is necessary to ensure peaceful working
relations and productivity, in short, "management's right to man-
age."'17 Labor and employment laws recognize that employers must
be given some leeway in determining what is best for the enterprise.
However, the law comes into play in order to provide protections
against dismissals that fall within certain categories deemed by labor,
employment, and civil rights laws to be unjustified. Even in union-
ized settings, where relations between employer and employee are
mediated though collective bargaining agreements, most of which
contain provisions guarding against unjust dismissals, managerial
prerogatives leave intact certain unchallengeable managerial deci-
sions over plant closings' 8 and layoffs over which employees, un-
ions, and government regulatory agencies may have little or no in-
put.
19
16. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term
Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV.
837, 837 (setting out the results of a survey examining nonunion employment
contract practices).
17. H.W. ARTHURS ET AL., LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
CANADA 298 (3d ed. 1988); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrong/i Discharge
Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1655, 1664 (1996) (defining
"what the defenders of at-will regard as legitimate employer discretion [as] the
power to evaluate employee conduct and performance and to make judgments
about what is best for the organization without being second-guessed by out-
siders").
18. See Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264 (6th Cir. 1980) (denying relief to plaintiff steel worker unions, a Con-
gressman from the district, and the Attorney General of Ohio, and holding that
the plaintiffs are not entitled to a court order directing the defendant to stay in
operation).
19. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994) (providing some protections for workers from
plant closing). For example, WARN requires employers who employ at least
100 workers and who intend to close the plant to give sixty days notice to un-
ions, workers, and the state and local government officials. See id. § 2102. If
proper notice is not given, then those workers are entitled to back pay and
fringe benefits they may have lost. See id. § 2104.
January 2001]
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In the at-will setting, in which employees are not covered by
collective bargaining agreements, legal and normative interpretations
of "management's right to manage" and employment at-will coalesce
to make it difficult for employees to attain legal redress for a termi-
nation they think is unfair. Job security for the vast majority of
workers is thus severely undermined. For instance, the employment
at-will doctrine makes ineffective an employee's argument that she
was dismissed because of her supervisor's personal grudge against
her. Under the at-will theory, it does not matter what the personal
motives of one's supervisor are. The firing of an otherwise good
worker who has become the object of an irrational grudge is pro-
tected under the at-will theory. According to the doctrine, as long as
the firing does not contravene state or federal labor or civil rights
legislation, or fall under common-law exceptions to the rule, an em-
ployee can be fired for any reason whatsoever. The employer need
not "show cause" to justify the dismissal. If the personal grudge re-
sults in workplace disharmony, the at-will doctrine allows for the
dismissal of the employee who is the subject of the grudge and im-
plicated in the disharmony. As one court put it:
The narrow exceptions to the 'employment at-will' doctrine
which we have recognized in [our previous decisions] were
not designed to prevent an employer from terminating an
at-will employee in order to eliminate unacceptable internal
conflict and turmoil. It matters little, if at all, who was
most at fault. An employer is not required to tolerate an
intolerable working environment.2
In other words, employee fault is not required to justify dismissal. In
effect, managerial prerogative came to define "just-cause" for dis-
missal.
Another problem with the at-will doctrine is its foundation in a
formal theory of equality. Because the doctrine is based on the
premise that employee and employer are equal bargaining partners in
the employment relationship, the doctrine does not take into account
the real, substantive inequality between the parties. Therefore, both
parties are deemed to be equally free to make good bargains, bad
20. Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flona, 715 A.2d 873,
886 (D.C. 1998).
[34:351
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bargains, or indeed no bargain at all. Since the at-will doctrine pro-
vides the basis upon which governmental regulation of employment
is constructed, its presumption of equality permeates interpretations
placed upon various themes in employment and labor law and often
masks actual inequality between employer and employee.
In addition, by permitting discharges without explanation the at-
will rule may provide employers with a shield against claims of dis-
criminatory dismissals, leaving inadequate protection for workers of
color, women, gays, and lesbians who cannot always rely on antidis-
crimination laws to address the systemic and often subtle forms of
discrimination to which they are regularly subjected. Studies suggest
that people of color are more likely than Whites to be involuntarily
discharged from employment,2' and that Black and Hispanic em-
ployees are more likely than Whites to hold mistaken views about
laws governing discharge.22 The at-will doctrine, therefore, must be
seen in the context of gross racial disparities both in the rates of dis-
charge and in workers' knowledge of their legal rights.
Similarly, given societal expectations about women's role in the
family, women are more likely to leave employment periodically in
order to raise children, creating a disincentive for employers to enter
into definite term employment contracts with women. Women are
disproportionately represented in the part-time and contingency
workforce and less likely to work in organized workplaces. 23 Con-
sequently, they are highly likely to be in at-will settings. When
21. See Hilary Silver, Firing Federal Employees: Does Race Make a Dif-
ference?, in U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., FEDERAL DIscHARGE RATES app.
D (1995).
22. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Lam: Exploring the Influ-
ences on Workers'Legal Klnovedge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 447, 476-77 (ex-
plaining that even after controlling for demographic factors such as income and
education, Black and Hispanic workers scored significantly worse on a test
measuring knowledge of the legal rules governing workplace dismissals). All
workers, however, tended to believe "that the law prohibits what fairness [i.e.
discharge for cause only] forbids." Id. at 480.
23. See Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States.
18 COMIP. LAB. L.J. 503, 506, 510 (1997) (stating that women represent two-
thirds of the part-time workforce; that the majority of temporary workers are
women, African American, and workers under the age of twenty-five; and that
most part-time and temporary jobs are unskilled, and many of these jobs pay at
or below the minimum wage).
January 200 1]
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women are the primary breadwinners for their families, which is of-
ten the case in African American households, 24 a loss of employment
compounds the difficulties they face in supporting their families.
In addition, the at-will doctrine provides employers with protec-
tion against charges of discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Unlike the legal treatment of enumerated grounds such as race, gen-
der, religion, and national origin, few laws exist to protect gays and
lesbians from discriminatory discharge in private employment.
25
Employers are free, in most jurisdictions, to discriminate against
gays and lesbians on the basis of sexual orientation, a practice facili-
tated by employment at-will. Moreover, there are no signs that Con-
gress and the majority of state legislatures will enact legislation pro-
tecting gays and lesbians from employment discrimination any time
soon.
Given that the majority of workers in the United States are em-
ployed at-will, that workers are generally in weaker bargaining posi-
tions than employers, that workers of color are more likely to be dis-
charged than Whites, that women are more likely to be in non-
unionized at-will positions, and that gays and lesbians cannot rely on
existing antidiscrimination laws to protect them from sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, a regulatory regime requiring notice or just-
cause for dismissal would be of real benefit to all workers. This is
especially true for those employees whose employment experiences
24. See JOYCE P. JACOBSEN, THE ECONOMICS OF GENDER 499 (1994) ("By
1990, less than two-fifths of [B]lack women were currently married. This
trend, combined with high birth rates for [B]lack women, has led to a high rate
of female-headed family formation.").
25. Prohibitions against private and public sector employment discrimina-
tion based on an employee's sexual orientation have been adopted in only nine
states. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West 1992) (repealed 1999); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (2000);
HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-2 (1993); MASs. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 151B, § 4
(West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 181.67 (1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7
(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 28-5-7
(2000); VT. STAT. ANN. fit. 3, § 961(6), tit. 21, §§ 495(a), 1726(a)(7) (1991);
Wis. STAT. § 111.31 (1999). Thirteen states offer some protection in the form
of executive orders against sexual orientation discrimination for state workers.
These states include Pennsylvania, California, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and Washington. In addition, about fifty cities have enacted laws prohibiting
discrimination in private employment on the basis of sexual orientation.
[34:351
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are affected by race and racism, sex and sexism, or homophobia, and
who cannot rely on current antidiscrimination law to address the
problem.
A substantive equality approach to employment requires that a
moratorium be placed on the use of the at-will doctrine. It is inde-
fensible that a law regulating the majority of employment contracts
in the United States has a more severe impact on certain already dis-
advantaged groups. At a minimum, the at-will rule should be re-
placed by legislation that requires an employer to provide minimum
notice, or pay in lieu of notice of discharge. Such a system would re-
sult in protections for everyone who is involuntarily discharged26 and
has an added benefit for certain groups who, for various reasons, are
left unprotected under existing antidiscrimination laws.
Several critics of at-will employment have argued that, given the
wide disparity between the bargaining powers of employer and em-
ployee, laws requiring a just-cause standard for discharge are desir-
able.27 This Article suggests, however, that a more desirable default
26. Ironically, enacting a more protective "just-cause" standard for dis-
charge may, in the long run, provide no added protection against sexual orien-
tation discrimination. Since there are so few antidiscrimination laws prohibit-
ing discharge on the basis of sexual orientation, there is a possibility that
dismissing someone based on sexual orientation will constitute "just-cause" for
discharge. For example, in the federal civil service, there are specific provi-
sions protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(10) (1998). However, there are cases in which an employee's sexual
orientation has successfully been invoked by an employer to justify discrimi-
natory treatment. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that the FBI's refusal to hire a lesbian was justified by the concern
that since she would have access to classified information, she would be highly
susceptible to blackmail).
27. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theor' of "Just
Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DuKE L.J. 594, 594; Estlund, su-
pra note 17, at 1667-68 (stating that there is a large disparity in bargaining
power between the employer and employee); Kim, supra note 22, at 449-50;
Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a
Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1445-46 (1996)
(stating that despite increased legislation, employees have even less job secu-
rity than in the past); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating
Just Cause and Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 20-28 (1993) (dis-
cussing the potential for opportunism by the employer over the employee);
Summers, supra note 23, at 504 (stating the at-will doctrine expresses and ef-
fectuates employer dominance).
January 2001]
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rule would require notice or pay in lieu of notice. Although a just-
cause default rule is an improvement over the current at-will rule, it
does not provide adequate protection against involuntary discharge
for people of color. People of color, in particular African Americans
and indigenous peoples, are more likely to be discharged than Whites
in federal public sector employment, where just-cause standards are
the norm. 28 Requiring just-cause for dismissal does not sufficiently
protect workers of color from involuntary discharge in federal gov-
ernment employment, nor is there reason to believe that such a re-
quirement, even if implemented, will protect them in the private
sector. If a racial disparity in dismissal rates exists in federal public
sector employment, it is likely that such a disparity exists in the pri-
vate sector as well.
In addition, employers are becoming much more sophisticated in
avoiding discrimination charges. It is increasingly rare that employ-
ers will leave direct evidence of discrimination supporting disparate
treatment analysis, or that there will be an identifiable employment
practice that is amenable to disparate impact analysis. Moreover,
there is a justifiable suspicion that employers will fabricate reasons
for dismissal that obscure discriminatory motives. In other words,
requiring the employer to articulate a just-cause for dismissal may
create an incentive for the employer to invent reasons for the dis-
charge. There seems to be little benefit to disadvantaged groups in
an approach that encourages employers to provide false reasons for
discharge instead of no reasons. Given the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,29 such invention is not
unlikely; for, according to this case, as long as the employer's ar-
ticulated reasons constitutes just-cause such as absences, lateness, or
insubordination, the employer is unlikely to be found liable for dis-
criminatory discharge. Moreover, in many cases the requirement of
just-cause will not deter discriminatory treatment because much of
the disparity in discharge rates is the result of unconscious, uninten-
tional bias, or systemic discrimination. The benefit of a reasonable
28. See Silver, supra note 21, at app. D-2.
29. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The Court held that a plaintiff in a disparate
treatment case bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer's prof-
fered reason for the adverse treatment was not its true reason, but was a pretext
for discrimination. See id. at 511.
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notice requirement is that it provides, at a minimum, some monetary
compensation in those instances in which the employer can provide
"cause," but where the "cause" obscures the intentional or uninten-
tional discriminatory treatment of minorities, women, gays, and les-
bians.
Admittedly, requiring notice instead of just-cause is an ac-
knowledgment that discrimination cannot always be ameliorated
through existing laws. Current antidiscrimination laws are ill-
equipped to address unintentional, subtle, or systemic discrimination.
Therefore, requiring at a minimum that every discharged employee
be given notice or pay in lieu of notice will have the benefit of com-
pensating members of historically disadvantaged groups and others
whose discharges do not easily fit into the existing civil rights para-
digm3° or common-law exceptions to the at-will rule.
The at-will doctrine's genesis at the turn of the twentieth century
during a period of widespread faith in laissez-faire free market eco-
nomic theory, resulted in hardship for employees. More than one
hundred years after it was introduced into American common-law it
continues to result in hardship for employees. The at-will doctrine
must be set aside in favor of a more equitable or just theory of em-
ployment relations. Clearly, when there are available to us alterna-
tive employment law regimes with similar roots in the common law
but whose effect on historically disadvantaged groups is not as se-
vere as at will, it is indefensible that the default rule in the United
States continues to be the at-will doctrine. Hence, the at-will doc-
trine, a legal invention stemming from a theory of formal equality
which assumes symmetry in bargaining strength between employer
and employee, 31 must be challenged because it contributes to the
30. See Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Under-
standing the Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L.
REv. 719, 772 (1991) (arguing that "[s]ociety has an interest in ensuring that
all employees are protected from abuse of employer power, and that protection
not be limited to those who experienced a particular type of abuse through dis-
crimination").
31. See, e.g., Payne v. W. & At. RL Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884).
According to the Payne court.
Men must be lef without interference to buy and sell where they
please, and to discharge or retain employ~s at will for good cause or
for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an
unlawful actper se. It is a right which an employee may exercise in
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erroneous assumption that those with the power to quit enjoy the
same advantage in the employment relationship as those with the
power to fire.32 In light of chronic inequality in the United States,
the at-will doctrine must be rejected as an anachronistic reflection of
a bygone era, ill-suited for regulating employment relations in which
one party has greater bargaining strength than the other. Indeed, it
contributes to that inequality. Furthermore, the at-will doctrine bol-
sters a system of employment regulation that perpetuates societal
inequalities between races, sexes, and classes and must therefore be
abandoned. A notice requirement should be implemented in its
place, thereby striking a better balance between the relevant social
interests such as job security, productivity, and employer autonomy.
III. THE LEGAL CONTEMPLATION OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND
THE RISE OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE
In the early part of the twentieth century, the United States Su-
preme Court made several pronouncements as to the importance of
freedom of contract in employment. Perhaps the most important
case of the early twentieth century in defining the scope of govern-
ment action is Lochner v. New York,33 in which the Supreme Court
struck down a New York statute that restricted the number of hours a
baker could work to ten per day. The Court stated:
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract
between the employer and employ~s, concerning the num-
ber of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of
the employer. The general right to make a contract in rela-
tion to his business is part of the liberty of the individual
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. Under that provision no State can deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the
the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause
as the employer.
Id.
32. See Jones v. Dunkirk Radiator Corp., 21 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that in practice, the at-will doctrine gives an employer "a nearly unfet-
tered right to discharge an employee").
33. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are cir-
cumstances which exclude the right.34
Shortly after Lochner, the Court issued another decision, Adair
v. United States, 35 in which it held that federal legislation outlawing
yellow-dog contracts, which are contracts in which workers agree not
to engage in union activities, was invalid.36 In Adair, the Court rea-
soned that employer and employee were equal, and that government
interference would have the effect of placing employees in a more
favorable position than their employers:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he
deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which
he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it.
So the right of the employ6 to quit the service of the em-
ployer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the serv-
ices of such employ6 .... In all such particulars the em-
ployer and the employ6 have equality of right, and any leg-
islation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract which no govern-
ment can legally justify in a free land. 3
34. Id. at 53 (citation omitted). But see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (upholding similar protective labor legislation when applied to women).
35. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
36. See id. at 180. The Court invalidates legislation prohibiting employers
from forcing employees to sign yellow-dog contracts because "it is not within
the functions of government... to compel any person in the course of his
business... [to] retain the personal services of another." Id. at 174.
37. Id. at 174-75. The Court's approach in Adair prompted these questions
by Roscoe Pound.
Why, then do courts persist in the fallacy? Why do so many of them
force upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of
practical conditions of inequality? Why do we find a great and
learned court [sic] in 1908 taking the long step into the past of dealing
with the relation between employer and employee in railway trans-
portation, as if the parties were individuals--as if they were farmers
haggling over the sale of a horse? Why is the legal conception of the
relation of employer and employee so at variance with the common
knowledge of mankind?
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909) (citation
omitted). One might argue that these questions are as apt today as they were in
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Another early statement as to the contractual principles upon
which the at-will doctrine is based was expressed in Coppage v.
Kansas,38 in which the Court held that state legislation outlawing
yellow-dog contracts constituted an unreasonable exercise of police
power and violated the private right to make contracts." The Court
stated, inter alia,
The principle is fundamental and vital. Included in the
right of personal liberty and the right of private property-
partaking of the nature of each-is the right to make con-
tracts .... The right is as essential to the laborer as to the
capitalist, to the poor as to the rich ... 4o
These cases illustrate the Court's approach to governmental
regulation of the workplace in the early part of this century. Gov-
ernment was not to intrude into the private bargains of individuals.
The state was characterized as an "ominous police power, acting ar-
bitrarily and clumsily overreaching its constitutional confines."'
Maintaining equality between employer and employee required re-
stricting judicial intervention. Consequently, freedom of contract
became the impetus for preserving the status quo. Cass Sunstein has
argued:
1908 when Pound wrote the above passage.
38. 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overmded by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
39. See id. at 15-16.
40. Id. at 14; see also Adldns v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923)
("[W]e cannot accept the doctrine that women of mature age, suijuris, require
or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could
not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances.");
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) ("It is undoubtedly true ... that
the general right to contract in relation to one's business is part of the liberty of
the individual, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution."); Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Minimum Contract Terms, with Impli-
cations for Labor Law, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1741, 1749-50 (1996) (explaining the
argument in Coppage as follows: "[B]ecause the employer may lawfully fire
an employee for any reason whatsoever in an at-will regime, it should be
within an employer's rights to condition employment on any requirement.").
41. Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of
American and Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech, 1994
Wis. L. REV. 1425, 1486. Although the author was discussing contemporary
notions of the state's role in regulating hate speech, I believe that the statement
is applicable to the Court's approach to other types of state regulation of pri-
vate relationships, such as employment relations.
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[F]or the Lociner Court, neutrality, understood in a par-
ticular way, was a constitutional requirement. The key
concepts here are threefold: government inaction, the ex-
isting distribution of wealth and entitlements, and the base-
line set by the common law. Governmental intervention
was constitutionally troublesome, whereas inaction was not;
and both neutrality and inaction were defined as respect for
the behavior of private actors pursuant to the common law,
in light of the existing distribution of wealth and entitle-
ments.42
"[T]he Court took as natural and inviolate a system that was legally
constructed and took the status quo as the foundation from which to
measure neutrality." 43
The law was not to intervene in the employment relationship.
Men were left to bargain for themselves. The market was entrusted
to balance the interests between employer and employee. It must be
remembered, however, that during this period the free market oper-
ated in a particular manner with respect to the races and sexes. For
example, it is quite obvious that economic freedom was not shared
by all men, especially those who were burdened by the legacy of
slavery. Yet the deference to the market shown by judges and politi-
cians led to some extraordinarily disingenuous statements, such as
the following one made by President Andrew Johnson during Recon-
struction:
[The freedman's] condition is not so bad. His labor is in
demand and he can change his dwelling place if one com-
munity or state does not please him. The laws that regulate
supply and demand will regulate his wages. The freedmen
can protect themselves, and being free, they could be self-
sustaining, capable of selecting their own employment, in-
sisting on proper wages ....44
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874
(1987).
43. Id. at 882.
44. W.E. BURGHARDT Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA
276 (1964).
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Clearly, the "benefits" of the free market did not take account of
the impediments imposed through slavery and its aftermath. 45 Yet
the law operated as though slavery was not connected to postslavery
economic deprivation. Employer and employee, as long as they were
male, were free to contract for whatever terms could be agreed
upon.46 This approach was not without its critics, however. For ex-
ample, in his 1908 essay, Roscoe Pound commented on the Court's
reluctance to uphold protective labor legislation for male workers:
Legislation designed to give laborers some measure of
practical independence, which, if allowed to operate, would
put them in a position of reasonable equality with their
masters, is said by courts, because it infringes on a theoreti-
cal equality, to be insulting to their manhood and degrad-
ing, to put them under guardianship, to create a class of
statutory laborers, and to stamp them as imbeciles.47
Legislative protection for (male) workers was seen by the courts
of the day to be a form of emasculation. All men are created equal.
So to provide protection for only some (i.e., employees) was to
threaten the concept of manhood (i.e., autonomy, independence,
etc.). An emasculated man was an "imbecile." Treating one party to
an employment contract "more favorably" was stigmatized by the
courts as a suggestion of inferiority.48  Underlying the Court's
45. See MELVIN M. LEIMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACISM: A
HISTORY 42 (1993) (arguing that "formal market equality masked substantive
inequality").
46. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) ("Of course the lib-
erty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it. The one has as
much right to purchase as the other to sell labor."). Moreover, according to the
Lochner Court
the real object and purpose [of the New York legislation limiting the
number of hours that could be worked by bakers] were simply to
regulate the hours of labor between the master and his employ6s ....
Under such circumstances the freedom of master and employ6 to con-
tract with each other in relation to their employment, and in defining
the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the
Federal Constitution.
Id. at 64.
47. Pound, supra note 37, at 463 (citations omitted). It is doubtful that
Pound was referring to the relations between Blacks and Whites. However, his
statement is apt regardless of the race of the parties.
48. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
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reluctance to promote governmental regulation of the employment
relationship was the presumption of employment at-will. The gov-
ernment had no right to interfere in a contractual relationship be-
tween employer and employee freely entered into by both parties.
Reflecting the importance of freedom of contract, the at-will rule re-
quired government "neutrality" or "inaction" in disputes involving
employment dismissals.49 Accordingly, the Supreme Court height-
ened the status of the at-will doctrine providing it near constitutional
protection.
Most commentators trace the at-will rule's beginnings in the
United States to the publication of a treatise written by a prominent
employment scholar, Horace Wood.50 According to Wood:
[w]ith us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite
hiring is prinafacie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks
to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week,
month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite
hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day
even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party
may serve.5'
Under Wood's theory, subsequently adopted by the courts, em-
ployment contracts that are silent as to the term of employment are
presumptively at-will. The party that wishes to argue otherwise has
the burden of establishing that the contract is for a particular term
and thus subject to breach of contract principles. Under Wood's
rule, the employer need not justify or provide notice of the dismissal.
Likewise, the employee was under no obligation to provide reasons
for quitting, nor was notice required. Hence, employer and em-
ployee were to be treated equally, their freedom to end the employ-
ment relationship at any time without notice unburdened by any legal
regulation. 2
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 38-39 (1995)
(discussing the notion of equality and suggesting that it results in disparate
treatment of women).
49. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 874.
50. See WOOD, supra note 14.
51. Id. at 272.
52. See Hylton, supra note 40, at 1752 ('[The] at-will doctrine recognizes
the employer's ownership of a job slot as a form of private property: just as
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This at-will rule represented a considerable divergence from
English common law which had until then provided the basis for
American employment regulation.53  Wood's theory did not take
hold in the United States until the end of the nineteenth century.
Earlier in the century, American courts had more or less adopted the
rules of English common law for determining the duration of em-
ployment contracts, "that an employment contract of indefinite dura-
tion was an annual hiring terminable only by notice."
54
For various reasons, however, this presumption of an annual
hiring was much weaker in the United States than in Britain,5 5 and
eventually the presumption was dropped in both countries. Though
in Britain a notice requirement gained strength, in the United States
at-will employment became the norm, defining the legal parameters
of governmental involvement in the employment relationship. The
rule was to be based on the notion that parties to an employment
contract are equal to each other, regardless of race, class, or gender,
and are to be given equal opportunity to abandon the employment
relationship without legal inquiry into their motivation. Late in the
twentieth century criticism of the at-will doctrine became wide-
spread. With this criticism, however, has come a spirited defense of
the doctrine articulated in the law and economics literature.
IV. THE DILATORY DECLINE OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Since the early years of the at-will doctrine, the courts have ar-
ticulated several justifications for its continued use,56 few of which
the owner of a parcel of land could exclude others from that parcel for any rea-
son whatsoever, so too could an employer exclude a worker from a job slot.").
53. On the other hand, American courts continued to follow the English
common-law rules for enforcing employment contracts of fixed duration.
These contracts could not be broken off prematurely except for cause. See
Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the
United States and England: An Historical Analysis, COMP. LAB. L., Winter
1992, at 85, 103.
54. Id. at 95.
55. See id. at 104.
56. The rule was justified as supporting freedom of contract, an important
public policy underlying employment relationships. Moreover, contract prin-
ciples such as consideration and mutuality have also been cited as essential to
the rule's foundation. See, e.g., Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 237 (4th
Cir. 1995); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 448-49 (7th Cir.
1987); Franklin v. Consol. Edison Co., No. 98 CIV. 2286 (WHP), 1999 WL
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have been left unquestioned. Yet, although the origin of and ration-
ale for the doctrine has generated controversy,5 7 the rule as it was ar-
ticulated by Wood continues to animate employment regulation
throughout the United States despite regular criticism from academ-
ics and many members of the judiciary.58 Some have argued, for ex-
ample, that the rule is flawed since it fails to adhere to rudimentary
contract principles.59 Others have questioned the doctrinal founda-
tion of the rule, suggesting that widespread acceptance of the rule
was based on misleading and unfounded assertions about its origin
by Wood.60 Still others have argued that the adherence to the at-will
doctrine in the United States is incongruent with the job protections
available to employees in other industrialized nations.6' There are
796170, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999); St Louis v. Mathews, 42 S.W. 902,
904-05 (Ark. 1897); Louisville v. Ouffutt, 36 S.W. 181, 182-83 (Ky. 1896);
Payne v. W. &AtL. R.R, 13 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884).
57. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Mvths: An Empirical and Eco-
nomic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REv. 679,
756-57 (1994) (arguing that the employment at-will rule predated the publica-
tion of Wood's treatise).
58. See, e.g., id. (questioning the foundation upon which the rule was based
and pointing out that the precedents relied upon by Wood were of questionable
authority and may have been wrongly interpreted). But see Mayer G. Freed &
Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22
ARIz. ST. L.J. 551, 554-56 (1990) (arguing that the precedents stood for ex-
actly what Wood had claimed, and that they supported Wood's interpretation
of the American default rule). In any case, the dispute about the origins of the
rule is beyond the focus of this Article. It is generally agreed that the rule was
memorialized in a treatise by Horace Wood, and that this treatise was later re-
lied upon by the judiciary or legislature in almost every state as black letter law
governing employment contracts.
59. See Note, supra note 9, at 1833.
60. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule,
20 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 118, 125-27 (1976) (stating that Wood's statement of
the employment at-will doctrine was ill-supported); Jacoby, supra note 53, at
111-13; Shapiro & Tune, supra note 2, at 341-43.
61. See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, Job Security in the United States: Some
Reflections on Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation from a Com-
parative Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REv. 28, 50-54 (1988) (stating that in the
United States an employer's right to dismiss an employee is granted more
protection than in nations such as Britain, Sweden, France, Germany, and Ja-
pan); Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 135 (1990) (arguing that the at-will rule is inconsistent with
collective bargaining and legal regulation of the work-place); Jack Stieber,
Protection Against Unfair Dismissal: A Comparative View, 3 CoMiP. LAB. L.
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those who assert that the at-will rule has made ineffective antidis-
crimination legislation and other wrongful discharge protections.
6 2
In addition, the rule's underlying presumption of equality has gener-
ated much criticism from judges and legal scholars alike. Most crit-
ics argue that the rule results in harsh treatment of employees who
seldom have the ability to negotiate over terms of an employment
contract and whose termination from work often has harmful conse-
quences.
Consistent with this scholarly criticism has been a change in
perception over the last several decades about the nature of work and
appropriate regulation of the workplace. Courts and legislatures
have begun to recognize that the public has an interest in regulation
of the workplace. So, for example, beginning with the New Deal,
legislation has been introduced to protect workers from discharge for
a whole host of reasons-legislation that earlier would have been
deemed unduly intrusive in the bargaining power of men.6 3 Collec-
tive bargaining protections were enacted, as were several other
pieces of legislation regulating the workplace.64 And, significantly,
229 (1979) (addressing statutes in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, and advo-
cating legislation in the United States of a similar force); Clyde W. Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REv. 481, 519-31 (1976) (proposing a statute providing legal protection to em-
ployees against unjust dismissal based upon the then existing arbitration sys-
tem); Clyde W. Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden? A
Comparative Study of Social Values in Five Countries, 70 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1033 (1995) [hereinafter Summers, Worker Dislocation] (comparing the
United States to the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Japan).
62. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 17, at 1657 (arguing that wrongful dis-
charge laws have not gotten rid of the at-will doctrine); McGinley, supra note
27, at 1445 (stating that despite increased legislation, employees have even less
job security).
63. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) of 1947, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994) (prescribing rights of employers and employees in
their relations affecting commerce); National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994) (providing the right of employees to organize col-
lectively); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1994) (addressing labor conditions that are detrimental to the maintenance of
a minimum standard of living and setting out minimum wage and overtime
provisions).
64. See Fair Labor Standards Act (Equal Pay Act), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1994) (guaranteeing equal pay for work of equal value); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (shielding workers from
discrimination on the basis of age); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
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the judiciary contributed to the erosion of the at-will rule by devel-
oping tort and contract protections against dismissal of nonunionized
workers. So, for example, in several states, public policy exceptions
to the at-wiU rule, implied and express contractual promises of job
security, and implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing have
softened the rule's impact on employees who have been discharged
for reasons that the courts have judged to fit within one of these ex-
ceptions. 65 All of these developments represent some recognition
that the relationship between the employer and employee is inher-
ently unequaL Despite these growing protections, however, the at-
will doctrine has continued to define the rights and responsibilities of
the parties to the employment contract since the nineteenth century.
The rule is intact, albeit under siege.66 Moreover, it continues to op-
erate in a social context that belies its presumption of equality be-
tween employer and employee.
V. MARKING THE MARGINS: INEQUALITY IN
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
Because it is crucial for employment laws to maintain a proper
balance between the interests of the employer, employee, and the
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994) (protecting workers against occupational injuries
and illness); Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 710-796 (1994) (protecting
workers from discrimination on the basis of disability); Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (shielding workers from discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995) (protecting workers from dis-
crimination on the basis of disability).
65. For a comprehensive discussion of common-law exceptions to the at-
will rule, see Peck, supra note 30, at 744. Peck notes that there are five cate-
gories of cases protecting workers from involuntary separations violative of
public policy: "(1) discharges for refusing to violate criminal or civil laws, (2)
discharges for having performed civic duties or statutory obligations, (3) dis-
charges for asserting statutory or constitutional rights or privileges, (4) dis-
charges for socially desirable performances not required by law, and (5) dis-
charges for what are recognized as socially reprehensible reasons."
66. But see Estlund, supra note 17, at 1655-56 (arguing that "the legal right
to fire for bad reasons has been virtually decimated" and "to judge from the
current debate over at-will employment, it would seem that the once-sweeping
at-will rule has been completely and happily erased to the extent of these
wrongful discharge exceptions, and that it now effectively governs only dis-
charges for good reasons, for no reasons, or for not-quite-good-enough or not-
demonstrably-good reasons").
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public, the at-will doctrine must be evaluated to measure its efficacy
in resolving the inevitable conflict of interests between employer and
employee, especially those interests that reflect differences between
people of color and Whites and differences resulting from women's
"gendered lives."' 67 The perseverance of the at-will doctrine suggests
that the interests of people of color and women will continue to be
subordinated in legal doctrine to accommodate formalistic notions of
equality that, in fact, perpetuate substantive inequality.
The at-will rule came about at a time when the labor market was
very different from that of today.68 The majority of women were not
employed outside the home; those who were employed outside the
home (i.e., poor, immigrant, or women of color) worked in other
people's homes, or in poorly paid, low-skilled jobs such as factory
work;69 slavery had only recently been abolished; rapid industriali-
zation was changing the nature of working relations; the courts were
67. Martha Fineman uses the term "gendered life" to express the idea that:
[A]s a socially and legally defined group, women share the potential
for experiencing a variety of situations, statuses, and ideological and
political impositions in which their gender is culturally relevant. These
experiences, be they actual or potential, provide the occasion for
women to develop an identifiable perspective that is rooted in their
appreciation of, and reaction to, the gendered nature of our social
world. This concept does not assume that women respond identically
to an appreciation of gendered existence. It does presume that with
gender revealed as a central social and cultural consideration,
women's attention in many areas can be directed productively toward
confronting and challenging the gendered implications of our lives.
FINEMAN, supra note 48, at 48.
68. Some have argued that the rule developed in a particular economic and
political context in which the judiciary was at the mercy of the capitalist class,
thus resulting in maintenance of the rule and its harsh results at the expense of
the worker. These critics argue that American discourse on the supremacy of
freedom of contract and individual rights and responsibilities has sustained the
doctrine and that the rule is ill-suited to current economic and social realities.
See Summers, Worker Dislocation, supra note 61.
69. See Ruth Feldstein, Labor Movement, in 1 BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA:
AN HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 685, 685-86 (Darlene Clark Hine et al. eds.,
1993) (discussing the labor movement and the fact that Black women have had
to labor outside their own homes); see also TERESA L. AMoTT & JULIE A.
MATTHAEI, RACE, GENDER AND WORK: A MULTICULTURAL ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 295-97 (1996) (describing em-
ployment for Blacks, Native Americans, and Chicanos as limited to domestic
service, and industrial and migrant farm work).
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extremely wary of labor unions; and worker organizations were
weak.70 Moreover, entry into the waged labor force was quite un-
even among the sexes and racial-ethnic groups. 71  Significantly,
working men and women of all races were at a stark disadvantage
vis-a-vis their employers in setting the terms of employment. State
and federal governments had to determine the most appropriate man-
ner of regulating the workplace at a time of great industrial and
demographic change. Governing the working relations between
women and recently emancipated slaves72 and their employers re-
quired special attention. The at-will doctrine, however, was ill-suited
to deal with these new employees who were not generally in posi-
tions to bargain on an equal footing with employers. Nor are women
and people of color on an equal footing today.73 The fiction under-
lying judicial pronouncements championing equality of bargaining
power between employer and employee is particularly inaccurate
when viewed from the perspectives of workers of color and female
workers. But, of course, these were not the perspectives that in-
formed judicial opinion.
The legal treatment of working men and women, particularly
women of color, has changed over time. The law has struggled to
find the appropriate standard by which to assess men's and women's
roles in the family and at work. John Stuart Mill contended that "the
common arrangement, by which the man earns the income and the
wife superintends the domestic expenditure, seems to me in general
the most suitable division of labour between the two persons.
70. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 158-66 (1991) (discussing the reformation of the labor
movement).
71. See AMOTT & MATTHAEI, supra note 69, at 300-01 (showing that in the
1920s, Filipino men had the highest employment rate, while married European
American women had the lowest).
72. Of course, not all Blacks at the time were former slaves. Nonetheless,
constitutional protections had only recently been afforded to African American
men.
73. See, e.g., Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salay Workers: First
Quarter 1999, at ftpl/146.142.4.23/publnews.releaselhistory/wkyeng.041599.
news (last modified Apr. 15, 1999).
74. CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 163 (1988) (quoting John
Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY 178-79
(A. S. Possi ed., 1970)).
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Until quite recently, the law expressly sustained this ideal, wherein
women were not to be involved in paid employment outside the
home. For example, in his now famous opinion in Bradwell v. Illi-
nois, 75 Justice Bradley explained that the law
as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide dif-
ference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman.... The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordi-
nance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the do-
mestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood.76
Thus, it was contemplated by the law of the day that women
were to be in the home,77 not in the workforce. This typical image of
women was reflected in law reform movements of the time. For ex-
ample, efforts at establishing a "family wage,"'78 which is defined as
wages that were adequate for male workers to support their families,
presupposed women's economic dependency on men and reinforced
the exclusion of women from paid employment. But, contrary to
these ideas about the appropriate role of women, women did work
outside the home. How then was women's paid employment to be
treated under the established models of freedom of contract? The at-
will rule presupposes equality in bargaining power between em-
ployer and employee. Treating parties the same only makes sense
when the parties enjoy equal bargaining strength. Ironically, this is
the point that was made in several early U.S. Supreme Court
75. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 141.
77. Of course, the courts did not generally have in mind women of color
when they spoke about women's roles. However, to the extent that they did,
women of color were also seen to naturally belong to the domestic sphere, al-
beit often employed as domestic servants. See AMOTT & MATTHAEI, supra
note 69, at 298 (explaining that the sexual division of labor resulting from the
domestic ideal of womanhood transcended differences in races and classes).
78. MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIvEs OF WOMEN: SOCIAL
WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 119 (rev. ed. 1996)
(discussing the fight to raise wages from that which supports only a single per-
son to a wage that is adequate for a man to support his family).
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decisions upholding laws regulating women's work.7 9 Differential
treatment was warranted since the sexes were not the same in their
ability to bargain, and these differences were biologically deter-
mined. Although in Lociner the Court failed to concede that worker
and employer were unequal in bargaining strength if the parties were
male, at about the same time it declared an exception with respect to
women, rooted in the "inherent difference between the two sexes,
and in the different functions in life which they perform."80 These
differences provided the rationale for treating women differently in
the area of work, as "women's unique biological role in reproduction
demanded their protection from the rigors of public life."'s At the
time, women workers were considerably less likely than men to be-
long to unions, and "female workers were often young, poor, for-
eign-born, transient, and easy to exploit.,,s2 Furthermore, if a hus-
band was able-bodied, it was seen as a disgrace for his wife to work
79. By the mid-eighteenth century, most states had passed laws regulating
the hours, wages, and working conditions of women workers. See Claudia
Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic Histor. of American
Women, in FOUNDATIONs OF EMPLOYMENT DIScRIMINATION LAW 290, 290
(John J. Donohue III ed., 1997). Goldin describes the various interpretations
of protective labor legislation:
According to one view, the legislation originated in the genuine con-
cerns of reformers about work conditions of all Americans and ulti-
mately benefited women workers. The opposing view is that protec-
tive legislation was intended to restrict the employment of female
workers and was passed under the guise of refbrm. Both views find
support in the historical narrative.
Id.
80. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908). The Muller Court further
stated that
The limitations which this statute places upon her contractual powers,
upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall la-
bor, are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the
benefit of all. Many words cannot make this plainer. The two sexes
differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in
the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued la-
bor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health
upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables
one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for
subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation ....
Id. at 422.
81. FINEMAN, supra note 48, at 37.
82. Goldin, supra note 79, at 291.
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outside the home for wages.83 Labor legislation that offered protec-
tion for women against the inevitable tendency for men to exploit
them was consistent with the social consensus of the time and clearly
constitutional. 84 The contradictions inherent in the law's protection
of women from the harms of the workplace is apparent when com-
parisons are made between the legal treatment of middle-class, mar-
ried, White women and others. "While the law arbitrarily overpro-
tected the married woman, it left those who lived outside a [White]
family setting to their own devices., 85 It is doubtful that the ex-
pressed concern for women's well being 86 extended to poor, single,
or minority women. Apparently, it was not the health of working
women of color with which the Court was concerned when it de-
clared that
83. See AMY DRu STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION
187 (1998) (describing it as injurious and a disgrace for a wife to work to sup-
port the family).
84. This protection, however, was only available to women in the "public"
sphere, that is in the realm of paid employment outside the household. Women
working within the home, either as paid servants or as unpaid housewives,
were largely precluded from the law's protective labor legislation. The genesis
of this different treatment came through the notion of "separate spheres." See
PATEMAN, supra note 74, at 117. According to Pateman,
[the] domestic relations of master-slave and master-servant, relations
between unequals, have given way to the relation between capitalist or
employer and wage labourer or worker .... The wage labourer now
stands as a civil equal with his employer in the public realm of the
capitalist market. A (house)wife remains in the private domestic
sphere, but the unequal relations of domestic life are 'naturally so' and
thus do not detract from the universal equality of the public world.
Id.
85. Nicole Arnaud-Duc, The Law's Contradictions, in A HISTORY OF
WOMEN IN THE WEST: EMERGING FEMINISM FROM REVOLUTION TO WORLD
WAR 80, 81 (Genevi6ve Fraisse & Michelle Perrot eds., 1993).
86. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the only purpose of "protective labor
laws" was to protect women from exploitation.
White male unions, in the late nineteenth century, fought for the pas-
sage of "protective legislation" that, by excluding women from dan-
gerous or unhealthy jobs and from overtime work, had the effect of
denying them highly paid factory jobs and confining them in lower-
paying (and also hazardous) sectors such as apparel and textile manu-
facture.
AMOTT & MATTHAEI, supra note 69, at 25.
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continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating
this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the
body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous off-
spring, the physical well-being of women becomes an ob-
ject of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race.
87
In fact, emancipated Black women were expected to work out-
side the home and failure to do so was thought to reflect laziness.
Moreover, there appeared to be general agreement in the North and
South that a higher value was to be placed on Black women's waged
work than on their household labor.88 Stanley observed:
[T]he [Freedmen's] bureau deprecated as idle the freed-
woman who only did unpaid household work---who refused
to turn her labor into a commodity .... "It is impossible for
the freedman to support himself and his family by working
five days a week and keeping a wife and daughter in idle-
ness," one [Freedmen's bureau] agent declared. "Unless
something is done by the Bureau in this country to induce
the freedmen to make the female members of their families
work in the crops next year there will be destitution
amongst them."
... Planters, too, dismissed house-work as idleness while
asserting claims to female labor that conflicted with the en-
titlements of freedmen as husbands. They appealed to the
bureau to require wives to enter into labor contracts and
return to the fields because men's work alone was not suffi-
cient to raise the crop or worth enough for family subsis-
tence." Allow me to call your attention to the fact that most
of the Freedwomen who have husbands are not at work-
never having made any contract at all-Their husbands are
at work, while they are as nearly idle as it is possible for
them to be, pretending to spin-knit or something that really
amounts to nothing .... "I think it would be a good thing to
87. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,421 (1908).
88. See STANLEY, supra note 83, at 188 (stating that household labor was
considered "idleness").
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put the women to work .... Are they not in some sort
vagrants as they are living without employment?" 89
Although there were vastly different societal expectations for
White women, women of color, and poor women, the ideal of
women's economic dependency was adopted in many communities
of color as well.90 For example, African American manhood was de-
fined on the same terms as those giving definition to White men's
masculinity,9' that is, men were to be the breadwinners, and women
were to tend to domestic matters, notwithstanding the greater partici-
pation in paid employment of women of color than of White women.
In any case, the participation of women of color in paid employment
did not contradict the dominant ideal of true womanhood, as women
of color were not seen as true women.92 Moreover, not only were
women of color to be found in paid employment in numbers greater
than White women, 93 but, often working in segregated and inferior
jobs, women of color were employed in establishments where they
were routinely required to work in excess of ten hours per day.
94
Throughout American history, women of color have always labored
in and outside of the home.95
89. Id. at 188-89 (citations omitted).
90. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 78, at 120-21 (examining African Ameri-
can attitudes about women's roles); see also AMoTT & MATTHAEI, supra note
69, at 300 (showing that African American women worked at a lesser rate than
their male counterparts).
91. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 78, at 119 (defining a man in terms of his
supremacy in the family).
92. See PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF
BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 43, 47 (1984) ("[T]he White
wife was hoisted on a pedestal so high that she was beyond the sensual reach
of her own husband. Black women were consigned to the other end of the
scale, as mistresses, whores, or breeders.").
93. In 1920, single women were more likely to work than married women,
but proportionately more married women of color worked for pay than White
women. For example, married African American women worked at a rate of
32.5%; Asian American, 18.5%; Puerto Rican, 13.1%; American Indian, 8.9%;
and European American, 6.5%. See AMOTr & MATTHAEI, supra note 69, at
299-301.
94. See JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SoRROW: BLACK
WOMEN, WORK AND THE FAMILY, FROM SLAVERY TO PRESENT 209 (1986)
(describing working conditions of Black women during the Great Depression).
95. See Feldstein, supra note 69, at 685-86 (explaining that "[r]acial and
sexual discrimination have marginalized this workforce, relegating Black
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Doubly burdened by the societal expectations of women's des-
ignated role, women who worked outside the home were also the
primary caretakers and workers within the family home.96 Conver-
sion of women's labor into a market commodity created difficulties
in attempts to reconcile women's traditional role as wife and mother
with their new roles as wage earners. Significantly, the at-will doc-
trine was developed during a time when "[a] husband ha[d] a right of
property in the service of his wife.",9 7 Therefore, women's work was
subject to two conflicting pressures: the pressure to submit to de-
mands made by husbands and the pressure to submit to employer
demands.
At the same time, the judiciary, charged with interpreting the at-
will presumption, was comprised of those same class of men as em-
ployers. Consequently, the interests of business owners were re-
flected in judicial opinion.98 Of course, Blacks, other people of
color, and women lacked representation in business, politics, and the
judiciary. This fact, however, was not seen as a legitimate concern
of the judiciary, or perhaps was not even within its contemplation
when deciding upon the appropriate manner of governmental regula-
tion of the workplace. 99
A classic example of the way in which racially motivated dis-
missal was treated under the at-will doctrine is found in Clarke it
Atlantic Stevedoring Co.'00 In that case, the plaintiff was the repre-
sentative of ninety-six African American men who had gone to work
for the defendant after the plaintiff had received a solicitation for
"200 colored longshoreman.' 0' The men were dismissed three
women to the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, to agricultural work and
domestic service and, more recently, to the unskilled service sector").
96. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and the
Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1996) (explaining that even today, full time
working women spend more time taking care of children and doing housework
than men).
97. STANLEY, supra note 83, at 175.
98. See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstreamn Legal Thought, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 18 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
99. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 895 ("The existing distribution of power
and resources as between [B]lacks and [W]hites should be taken by courts as
simply 'there'; neutrality lies in inaction; it is threatened when the Court 'takes
sides' by preferring those disadvantaged.").
100. 163 F. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1908).
101. Id. The letter soliciting the workers stated, inter alia,
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months later and replaced by White workers. The plaintiff brought
an action for breach of "a contract to furnish continuous employment
at a reasonable rate of wages."'' 0 2 The court found for the defendant,
stating that:
The allegation of the complaint that the colored men were
replaced by white, and the date of their discharge showing
that the discharges all took place at one time, indicate a
complete departure from the intent or mental attitude of the
defendant's superintendent, as evidenced by the statement
that "we propose to keep colored men at work as long as
they fulfill their part of the program" This change of pur-
pose may have caused hardship to a number of innocent
workmen, but the matter must be determined according to
the parties' legal rights, and not from the standpoint of
sympathy or approval of the economic questions involved,
and it seems to the court that the plaintiff has shown no
agreement with the defendant by which it bound itself to
continue the plan of employing colored workmen longer
than it might see fit to do.'
0 3
As a result of this and other examples of "racial occupational
eviction,"'' 0 4 the employment status of African Americans and other
workers of color was tenuous. White workers organized strikes and
other, often violent, actions against employers who hired Black and
Asian workers. The process of "racial job displacement"'1 5 was well
under way across the United States during a time when judicial def-
erence to the at-will rule was at its strongest. Prior to state and fed-
eral civil rights legislation that made it illegal to discriminate against
someone on the basis of race, the employment at-will doctrine
I have work immediately for 200 colored longshoremen, and can
guarantee the above number continuous work, providing they are good
men. This Company pays the usual rate of wages, namely, 30 [cents]
per [hour during the] day and 45 [cents] per [hour] at night. We pro-
pose to keep colored men at work as long as they fulfill their part of
the program.
Id. at 423-24.
102. Id. at 424.
103. Id. at425.
104. HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM:
RACE, WORK, AND THE LAW 14 (1977).
105. Id. at 15.
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bolstered the overt discriminatory practices of employers and unions
alike.
Through unionization employees have gained some protection
against dismissal by the inclusion of just-cause provisions in collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Even so, many would argue that just-
cause provisions by no means.elevate the bargaining power of work-
ers to that of employers, and that labor relations law only acts to rein-
force uneven bargaining strength. 10 6 This may be so, but in any case,
the rate of unionization in the United States has declined dramati-
cally over the past two decades. In 1998, 13.9 % of all wage and sal-
ary workers were unionized, as compared to 20.1 % in 1983.107
There are many theories as to what accounts for this downward
trend.'0 8 But whatever the cause, it is clear that with current low lev-
els of unemployment, 10 9 and the low proportion of unionization,
nonunionized workers account for more of the workforce than they
did even as recently as the early 1980s." °
106. "Law does not operate neutrally but, by virtue of the pro-capital per-
spective which its rules embody, works in a hidden way, to promote manage-
rial ends." Joanne Conaghan, The Invisibility of Women in Labour Law: Gen-
der-Neutrality in Model-Building, in 2 FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 345, 347
(Frances E. Olsen ed., 1995) (citing Karl Klare, Critical Theory and Labour
Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 75 (David
Kairys ed., 1997)).
107. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION
MEMBERS SUMMARY, available at http'//stats.bls.gov:80/news.release/union2.
nws.htm (last visited May 24, 1999) [hereinafter UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY].
108. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism:
The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Col-
lective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 575, 643 (1992) (arguing "in
favor of the view which attributed union decline to a decline in the actual and
perceived effectiveness of unions").
109. See M.V. Lee Badgett, Where the Jobs Went in the 1990-91 Downturn:
Varying (Mis)Fortunes or Homogeneous Distress?, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND
RACE RELATIONS IN THE POST REAGAN-BUSH ERA 99, 99 (Samuel L. Myers,
Jr. ed., 1997) (stating that the unemployment rate has dropped from 7.7% in
1992).
110. In 1998, "[u]nion membership [was] higher among men (16.1%) than
women (11.4%)." Interestingly, a higher percentage of Blacks were members
of unions "(17.2%) than Whites (13.5%) and Hispanics (11.9%). Among
[these groups], [B]lack men continued to have the highest union membership
rate (20.5%), while [W]hite and Hispanic women continued to have the lowest
rates (10.9% and 10.6%, respectively)." UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY, supra
note 107.
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Moreover, statistical data suggest significant differences in em-
ployment experiences between the races and the sexes. For example,
women workers earned on average seventy-six percent of men's
earnings in 1998,111 are less likely to belong to a union, 112 and are
more likely to be poor than men. 113 Women constitute about two-
thirds of the part-time workforce" 4 and two-thirds of the temporary
workforce.' 15 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,116 predicates
redress on an employer having a specified number of employees for
a specified number of weeks, which often bars claims by contingent
workers. Therefore, contingent workers, who are mostly women
cannot rely on the antidiscrimination laws that bar these claims.
117
Additionally, Black and Hispanic workers, both men and women,
earn less than their White counterparts" 8 and experience poverty
rates that are more than twice the rates of Whites.1 19 Black working
women have a poverty rate almost twice that of Black working
men. 20 Reemployment rates amongst displaced workers12 ' are also
111. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN 1998, available at
http://stats.bls.gov:80/cpswom98.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2000) [hereinafter
HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EARNINGS].
112. See id.
113. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A PROFILE
OF THE WORKING POOR, 1996, available at http://stats.bls.gov:80/cpswp
96.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2000) [hereinafter A PROFILE OF THE WORKING
POOR].
114. See Chris Tilly, Short Hours, Short Shrift: The Causes and Conse-
quences of Part-Time Employment, in NEW POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND
CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 15, 42 (1992).
115. See Francois Carre, Temporary Employment in the Eighties, in NEW
POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 15, 58 (1992).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to -17 (1994).
117. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND
LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 340 (2d ed. 1998).
118. In 1998, White workers of either gender earned more than their Black
or Hispanic counterparts. The differences among women, however, were
much smaller than among men. White women's earnings ($468) were 17.0%
higher than Black women's ($400), and 38.9% higher than those for Hispanic
women ($337). In contrast, White men's earnings ($615) were 31.4% higher
than the earnings of their Black counterparts ($468), and 57.7% greater than
those of Hispanic men ($390). See HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EARNINGS, su-
pra note 111.
119. See A PROFILE OF THE WORKING POOR, supra note 113.
120. See id.
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telling. Men are more likely to find new jobs than women, and
Whites are more likely to be reemployed than Blacks or Hispanics.12
Moreover, women and people of color continue to face barriers to
advancement once they are employed. According to the Federal
Glass Ceiling Commission:
[Ninety seven] percent of the senior managers of Fortune
1000 Industrial and Fortune 500 companies are white, and
95 to 97 percent are male; in the Fortune 2000 industrial
and service companies, only 5 percent of senior managers
are women, and almost all of them are [W]hite; African
American men with professional degrees earn 21 percent
less than their white counterparts holding the same degrees
in the same job categories. But women and African Ameri-
cans are not the only ones kept down by the glass ceiling.
Only 0.4 percent of managers are Hispanic, although His-
panics make up eight percent of America's workforce.
Asian and Pacific Islander Americans earn less than whites
in comparable positions and receive fewer promotions, de-
spite more formal education than other groups. Generally,
the lack of educational opportunity drastically reduces the
available pool of American Indian candidates and CEOs
rarely consider them for management jobs. These numbers
are put in context by the fact that in our society, two-thirds
of the population-and 57 percent of workers-are women,
minorities or both.12
121. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKER
DISPLACEMENT, 1995-97, available at ftp'Jl146.142.4.23/publnews.releasel
disp.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2000) [hereinafter WORKER DISPLACEMENT]
(defining displaced workers as "persons aged 20 years or older who lost or left
[their] jobs because their plant or company closed or moved, there was insuffi-
cient work for them to do, or their position or shift was abolished").
122. See id.
123. FED. GLASS CEILING COM,'N, A SOLID INVESTMENT: MAKING FULL
USE OF THE NATION'S HumN CAPITAL 9-10 (1995); see also Joe R. Feagin,
Fighting White Racism: The Future of Equal Rights in the United States, in
CIVIL RIGHTS AND RACE RELATIONS IN THE POST REAGAN-BUSH ERA 29, 37
(Samuel L. Myers, Jr. ed., 1997) ("[I]n 1994 not one of the Fortune 1000
companies had an African American as its head. (There were only two White
women at the helm of these companies.)"); Patricia Williams, Disorder in the
House: The New World Order and the Socioeconomic Status of Women, in
THEORIZING BLACK FEMINISMS: THE VISIONARY PRAGMATISM OF BLACK
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By international standards, African Americans and Hispanics do
not fare well economically:
For example, in 1993 the United Nations released a Human
Development [Index (HDI)] ... that measures overall qual-
ity of life in a country: the HDI includes measures of life
expectancy, education, and income for each country and for
certain racial-ethnic subgroups within certain countries.
According to the report, U.S. "Whites rank number one in
the world (ahead of Japan), [B]lacks rank number 31 (next
to Trinidad and Tobago), and Hispanics rank number 35
(next to Estonia).'1
2 4
Moreover, the annual average earnings of employees by sex and
sexual orientation suggest that gays and lesbians are not on par with
heterosexual men and women when it comes to average earnings:
heterosexual men earn on average $28,312 per year; homosex-
ual/bisexual men earn $26,321; heterosexual women earn $18,341;
and homosexual/bisexual women earn $15,056.125 And, along with
economic restructuring and the internationalization of the labor
force, women are more likely than ever to be concentrated in unde-
sirable service positions 1 6 requiring few skills, with poor job secu-
rity. Yet, even within these low-paid service jobs, racial distinctions
between workers of the same sex can occur. For example, White
women are more likely to be supervisors, while women of color are
more likely to be supervised. 1
27
What are the consequences of these labor patterns to an analysis
of the job security of workers employed at-will? Every economic
WOMEN 118, 119 (Stanlie M. James & Abena P.A. Busia eds., 1993) (citing
Judy Mann, The Shatterproof Ceiling, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1990, at D3).
124. Feagin, supra note 123, at 38 (emphasis added) (citing Carole Collins,
U.N. Report on Minorities: U.S. Not Measuring Up, NAT'L CATH. REP., June
18, 1993, at 9).
125. See M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Dis-
crimination, 48 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 726, 734 (1995).
126. See WORKER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 121 (stating that in "service
producing industries ... a majority of employees are women").
127. See Rose M. Brewer, Theorizing Race, Class and Gender: The New
Scholarship of Black Feminist Intellectuals and Black Women's Labor, in
THEORIZING BLACK FEMINISMS: THE VISIONARY PRAGMATISM OF BLACK
WOMEN 13, 21 (Stanlie M. James & Abena P.A. Busia eds., 1993) (discussing
the collapse of racial and gender divisions of labor).
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indicator suggests that, as a group, women and people of color are in
precarious positions in the workplace vis-a-vis White men. There-
fore, the question of job security is an important one. It is a serious
concern for any employee who is fired for no reason without an op-
portunity to challenge the dismissal In the year 2000, women and
people of color constitute two-thirds of the new labor force en-
trants,1 8 making the legal regulation of the workplace of primary
concern to them This concern is heightened in view of the relative
ease with which domestic and multinational companies can move
jobs from the United States overseas. The global labor market forces
low-wage and low-skilled U.S. workers into competition with work-
ers in poorer countries. 129 And again economic indicators suggest
that women and people of color who are displaced from their jobs are
less likely than White men to find new employment. For people of
color, women, and lesbians and gay men, the at-will doctrine has a
particularly pernicious effect on their job security, and thus, they are
economically and socially disadvantaged vis-a-vis employers who
are overwhelmingly White and male. The notion that employers and
employees are equal in their capacity to bargain over terms of em-
ployment, free from economic and social privileges and constraints is
no more true today than it was during the rise of the at-will doctrine
more than a century ago. The sentiment that parties to the employ-
ment contract share an equality of bargaining power continues to ob-
scure the at-will doctrine's privileging of business interests over
those of the workers. To continue with a system of employment
regulation that presumes equality in bargaining power between em-
ployer and employee is to contribute to the perpetuation of inequality
between the majority of workers and their employers.
VI. DFFERENTIAL DISCHARGE RATES, TrrLE VII,
AND EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL
It has been estimated that approximately sixty million employ-
ees in the private sector are subject to the at-will rule, and that 1.4
million of them are fired each year. 30 Estimates also indicate that at
128. See FED. GLASS CEILING COMM'N, supra note 123, at 10.
129. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
130. See RoTHsTEN & LIEBMAN, supra note 7, at 910.
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least 140,000 discharges are "unjust.' 31 In addition, the volume and
nature of employment discrimination litigation has shifted over the
years from hiring complaints to firing complaints.132 Just after Title
VII came into affect, the majority of discrimination claims dealt with
hirings. By 1985, however, there were six times more discharge
cases filed per year than hiring cases.'33 This figure does not neces-
sarily establish that there is more discrimination today than before,
nor that employers are more likely to discriminate in discharges than
in hiring. It may be, for example, that having overcome the most
egregious barriers in the hiring process, Title VII litigants are now
more likely to bring actions in order to protect their jobs. Yet, for
various reasons, few studies of job terminations by race or gender
have been conducted, 34 and of those that have looked at racial vari-
ables explicitly, most have examined public sector employment.
Those that examine race explicitly (either in public or private em-
ployment) have found that Blacks are roughly twice as likely as
Whites to be laid off or fired, 135 confirming the view that Blacks and
131. See Jack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Dis-
charge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 319, 324
(1983).
132. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 983-84 (1991)
(demonstrating that "the volume of federal employment discrimination litiga-
tion has grown spectacularly, many times faster than the overall federal civil
caseload").
133. The "[h]iring charges outnumbered termination charges by 50% in
1966, but by 1985, the ratio had reversed by more than six to one." Id. at
1015. Interestingly, the authors conclude that such a shift "actually provide[s]
employers with a disincentive--perhaps even a net disincentive--to hire mi-
norities and women." Id. at 1032.
134. See Craig Zwerling & Hilary Silver, Race and Job Dismissals in a Fed-
eral Bureaucracy, 57 AM. Soc. REv. 651, 651 (1992) (suggesting that "docu-
menting discrimination in firing is particularly difficult in employment at will
states"). According to the authors, employment laws that regulate firing based
on "race, age, gender, religion, national origin, marital status, disability, or in
retaliation for union-related and other specifically protected activity... protect
employer discretion and may result in rather arbitrary causes for dismissal,
which may account for the lack of significant predictors in prior studies." Id.
at 658; see also Silver, supra note 21, at app. D-3 (stating that, "the possibility
of racial discrimination in firings [is] a subject that has not been extensively
examined in private employment").
135. See Silver, supra note 21, at app. D-4.
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other minorities are more likely than Whites to leave their jobs in-
voluntarily. 136 There are, of course, possible reasons for these differ-
ences that do not necessarily involve discriminatory employment
practices. For example, it may be that the results are traceable to
concrete differences in the rates of absenteeism, accidents, injuries,
discipline record, and length of employment. However, studies sug-
gest that these factors are not responsible for the different dismissal
rates. One study of Black and White employees in the U.S. Postal
Service indicated that Blacks were more than twice as likely as
Whites to be fired regardless of length of employment, job category,
or personal characteristics; that the rate of accidents, injuries, or dis-
ciplinary actions were not significantly different between Blacks and
Whites; that Blacks were not more likely to voluntarily terminate
employment; that Blacks were less likely to have excessive absen-
teeism; and that Blacks were no more likely than Whites to be dis-
missed either during or following the probationary period.
137
In 1995, the United States Office of Personnel Management un-
dertook a comprehensive examination of discharge rates of federal
employees after a statistical report revealed that, while discharge
rates were low overall, 138 minority employees13 9 were more likely
than nonminorities' 40 to be discharged. In the same study, findings
indicated that minority employees were involuntarily discharged at a
rate of ten per thousand, while nonminorities were discharged at a
136. It appears that the rates of firing differ between racial minority groups.
See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text
137. See Silver, supra note 21.
138. Of the 2,171,000 non-Postal executive branch civilian workforce in
1992, nearly 12,000 minority and nonminority employees were discharged,
representing about one-half percent of one percent of those employed. See Sil-
ver, supra note 21, at app. D-6.
139. "Minority" was defined in the Central Personnel Data File ("the data-
base maintained by the Office of Personnel Management containing demo-
graphic and job information on individual federal employees") as an "em-
ployee whose Race/National Origin Code... reflects Hispanic or, except in
Puerto Rico, one of the following: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian
or Pacific Islander, Black (not of Hispanic origin)." U.S. OFFICE OF PERS.
MGMT., FEDERAL DISCHARGE RATES apps. F, F-4 (1995).
140. "Nonminority" was defined in the Central Personnel Data File as an
"employee whose Race/National Origin Code reflects White (not of Hispanic
origin) or Not Hispanic in Puerto Rico." Id.
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rate of about three per thousand. 14 1 The study found that "African
American[s] and Native American[s] ... were.., more likely to be
fired than others with comparable jobs, performance, work history,
and background characteristics" and examined three samples of fed-
eral workers: "those with appeal rights, those without such rights
and probationers."' 142  The study concluded that "being African
American was among the five most important determinants of dis-
missal in every model examined."' 143 For example:
African American workers with appeal rights were 3.7
times more likely to be dismissed than Whites, Hispanics,
and Asian/Pacific Islanders before other factors were taken
into account, but 2.4 times more likely to be dismissed after
controlling for education, age, length of service, veteran
status, work schedule, hiring conditions, major occupational
category, place of work, government agency, pay level, and
work history. 1
44
Although the two studies discussed above suggest racial differ-
entials in public sector firing, there is no reason to think that the re-
sults would be better in private employment. In fact, there is reason
to believe that the racial differences in the rates of involuntary termi-
nations in private employment may be even more dramatic. In
Zwerling and Silver's study of U.S. Postal workers, the authors sug-
gest that "if racial discrimination exists in government employment,
it is likely to be even more common in nonpublic sectors of the labor
market.' ' 145 The reasons are somewhat intuitive. 146 Government has
provided disproportionately more jobs for Blacks and other minori-
ties, more high- and middle-level occupations, greater opportunity
and job security, good chances for advancement, and higher
wages.' 47 Moreover, federal and state governments are subject to
strict Equal Employment Opportunity, civil service, and union
141. See Silver, supra note 21, at app. D-4.
142. Id. at app. D-2.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Zwerling & Silver, supra note 134, at 653.
146. See Silver, supra note 21, at app. D-3 (showing indirect evidence that
suggests that minorities consider government to be more equitable than private
employment).
147. See Zwerling & Silver, supra note 134, at 652-53.
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regulations. Federal employment figures suggest that
in contrast with the private sector, public sector employ-
ment offers African Americans equal opportunity for ad-
vancement and higher, if not always equal wages in return
for identical human capital. This is not to say that African
American government workers do not experience discrimi-
nation nor that their opportunities have not fluctuated over
time. However, there is reason to believe that the obstacles
to equal opportunity are even greater in the private sec-
tor.
14 8
Therefore, we would expect that minorities and Whites are more
likely to be treated equally with respect to dismissals in the public
sector than in the private sector.' 49 If this is so, then it seems likely
that dismissals of workers of color fall into at least four categories:
first, those that are completely unrelated to discriminatory motives or
employer practices; second, those that are due to discriminatory em-
ployer motives or practices, but are not easily identifiable as such;
third, those that clearly stem from discriminatory motives or practice;
and finally, a combination of the first three types. 150 Unfortunately,
no comprehensive examination of the reasons for dismissing at-will
employees in the private sector has ever been undertaken. Moreover,
given the nature of at-will employment, it seems unlikely that such a
study can be done since, by definition, employers are not compelled
to state any reasons for the discharge.
On the other hand, if the different rates of termination are due to
discriminatory termination practices, one hopes that Blacks and other
people of color, as the intended beneficiaries of antidiscrimination
statutes, may find remedies in the courts and administrative agencies
that administer these statutes. In fact, one might argue that the "true"
at-will employee is the white, male worker who cannot argue that he
has been discriminated against on the basis of race or sex since the
myriad of civil rights laws set up to protect minorities and women
148. Silver, supra note 21, at app. D-3.
149. See Zwerling & Silver, supra note 134, at 653.
150. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42, 258 (1989)
(holding that Title VII prohibits employment decisions resulting from a mix-
ture of legitimate and illegitimate motives).
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are unavailable to him. 5' He must rely solely on common-law ex-
ceptions to the at-will rule.152 However, it is unlikely that his dis-
charge is the result of immaterial gender or racial considerations.
Moreover, it is common to hear self-congratulatory statements about
the progress made in providing equal employment opportunity to
everyone, and to declare that the multitude of antidiscrimination laws
are signs that we have achieved both racial and gender equality.
These statements reflect beliefs that discrimination against people of
color and women today is no longer a serious problem. 153 Further-
more, there is the belief that any remaining discrimination or hostil-
ity directed at minorities and women is evidence only of the isolated,
aberrant, or deviant behavior of a few, and that in the unlikely event
that an employee has been discriminated against, she can always rely
on the law to address the problem. Yet, closer examination of race
and gender in employment suggests otherwise. For example, in
1999, race-based discrimination charges comprised the highest per-
centage of charges filed with the EEOC: African American men and
women accounted for eighty-six percent of the more than 30,000
race-based discrimination charges filed with the EEOC in 1995,14
151. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 1679. According to Estlund:
[T]he superimposition of the antidiscrimination laws on top of an at-
will background... may ... contribute to... divisive tensions be-
tween the members of "protected groups," such as women and mi-
norities, and other employees. While the latter normally have no re-
course at all against an unfair employment action, including discharge,
the former may have a potential remedy if they plausibly claim dis-
crimination.
Id.
152. See id. (arguing that the contrast between the laws available to women
and minorities and White men may lead White men "exposed to the full brunt
of the at-will regime, to see 'special treatment' of women and minorities when
there may in fact be only an inadequate remedy for discrimination and superfi-
cial efforts by the employer to avoid litigation and liability").
153. See Feagin, supra note 123, at 29, 30-32 (citing the results of several
studies that suggest that a majority of Whites refuse to view racial discrimina-
tion as a major barrier to people of color).
154. See U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY 1992
THROUGH FY 1999, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 1999) [hereinafter CHARGE STATISTICS]; see also Feagin, supra
note 123, at 32-35 (citing studies that suggest that there are perhaps millions of
serious cases of employment discrimination that go unreported in the United
States).
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and sex discrimination charges comprised the second highest per-
centage.1 5 5 As discussed above, it appears that African Americans
and other minorities are subject to a higher rate of involuntary dis-
missal than Whites. 156 Clearly race and gender discrimination in
employment remains a serious problem. Yet, middle-class women
and people of color are often offered as "examples of the success of
equal opportunity and affirmative action programs."' 5 7 And, with
the advent of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other an-
tidiscrimination legislation, many believe that the vestiges of em-
ployment discrimination can be addressed by resort to statutory
mechanisms. 1 8 Nonetheless, even with the buildup of antidiscrimi-
nation laws since the mid-1960s, for many reasons race and gender
discrimination continue to evade legal sanction.
The reasons abound. First, even with the proliferation of anti-
discrimination laws or perhaps because of them, employers have be-
come more sophisticated in concealing racially discriminatory moti-
vations and practices. Management consultants and lawyers have
found fertile ground in industrial relations advising companies as to
the best ways to avoid charges of discrimination.159 Therefore, direct
evidence of discrimination is less available to plaintiffs now than in
the past.' 60 Moreover, "the flagrant and obvious violations of the
pre-Title VII era--systemic refusal to hire women or minorities for
certain jobs, gross disparities in pay for identical jobs, segregated
work place facilities-were much more likely to produce plaintiff
victories than the subtler and less-frequent forms of discrimination
155. See CHARGE STATISTICS, supra note 154 (sex discrimination charges
accounted for 30.9% of charges in 1999).
156. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
157. JOE R. FEAGAN & MELVIN SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM viii (1994).
158. Of course, discrimination against individuals or groups based on "un-
protected" characteristics like sexual orientation is particularly troublesome
because of the dearth of legal safeguards.
159. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and
Substance in Employment Discrimination Lmv Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 959 (1999) (examining the strategies of management attorneys to safe-
guard employers against discrimination and employment-related litigation).
160. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 1680 ("It is... increasingly rare to find
'smoking gun' evidence of discrimination, or to find an employer who does not
have some evidence.., of some other reason for an allegedly discriminatory
firing or refusal to hire or to promote.").
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practiced today."'161 Employers are more sophisticated and are less
likely to engage in the type of discriminatory behavior that is most
easily addressed by existing antidiscrimination laws.
Second, the demanding process of filing a charge of discrimina-
tion with the EEOC may be a deterrent to many employees who, for
various reasons, do not file charges. 162 Title VII and other federal
antidiscrimination statutes rely primarily on the willingness and abil-
ity of private individuals to "identify violations, report them to the
authorities, and participate in enforcement proceedings . ,163 If
workers are unable to bring suit because of lack of resources or in-
formation, the effectiveness of Title VII is reduced. In the Donohue
and Siegelman study, the authors suggest that "[t]he propensity of a
rejected worker to sue will typically be a positive function of the
wage in the job from which she is rejected. Holding other things...
constant, an increase in the wage rate will increase the expected
benefits of litigation . ,,64 Their hypothesis seems born out with
figures that show "nonwhite plaintiffs.., were far more likely to be
managerial/professional workers or technical/sales workers than
nonwhite workers nationally. Conversely, the relatively low-paid
service and agricultural workers were substantially under-represented
in the sample of nonwhite employment discrimination plaintiffs.' ' 165
As in other areas of civil litigation, wealth does seem to play an im-
portant role in decisions to pursue litigation.
Moreover, if an employee's salary level determines willingness
to bring suit under Title VII, then wages surely influence a worker's
161. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 132, at 1032.
162. See McGinley, supra note 27, at 1454 (suggesting several reasons, in-
cluding the length of time to process a charge and take it to trial; the great cost
associated with intensive discovery; and the amount of emotional turmoil, thus
leaving many workers to leave litigation to wealthier plaintiffs).
163. Kristin Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the
Model of Legal Protection, in FOUNDATIONs OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 240-41 (John Donohue III ed., 1997).
164. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 132, at 1006-07. The authors offer
these factors as reasons for the increase in Title VII litigation even though they
believe that the overall amount of discrimination has decreased since the en-
actment of Title VII. Nonetheless, their figures indicate that low-paid workers
are substantially less likely to bring suit under Title VII than their higher paid
counterparts.
165. Id. at 1008.
[34:351
RACIAL RELEASES
decision to bring a wrongful discharge claim. In fact, there is reason
to suspect that minority employees are even worse off litigating
wrongful discharge claims than Title VII or other antidiscrimination
claims. 166 Professor Clyde Summers provides interesting evidence
that litigating wrongful discharge claims is rarely advantageous to
employees.
[Miore than half of those discharged employees whose
cases are judicially resolved obtain nothing .... One sur-
vey estimated that 95 percent of the cases are settled [before
adjudication] .... Overall, plaintiffs probably recover sub-
stantially less than half as much if the case is settled than if
it goes to court and is won .... Relatively few plaintiffs
are hourly wage or clerical workers; the large majority are
professional employees or are in middle and upper man-
agement.
167
Since the rate of Title VII and wrongful discharge litigation depends
to some extent on wages, then so long as women and people of color
are concentrated in low-paying positions, they are not likely to bring
suit to address perceived unfair or discriminatory discharges.
Third, there is some evidence that noneconomic factors play an
important role when deciding whether or not to litigate. Studies sug-
gest that victims of employment discrimination are less likely to pur-
sue their claims in court than are persons involved in contract or
landlord-tenant disputes.' 68  Kristin Bumiller suggests that the
166. Gay and lesbian plaintiffs who have been discharged because of their
sexual orientation confront a somewhat different problem when trying to in-
voke public policy exceptions to at-will via wrongful discharge claims. With
respect to wrongful discharge claims, courts have taken different approaches as
to the method for discerning the public policy. Most jurisdictions that recog-
nize public policy exceptions to at-will employment look to specific statutory
language expressing the public interest. However, "without an anti-
discrimination law in place in that jurisdiction [prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation], the courts find that there is no evidence that pub-
lic policy frowns upon such firings." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D.
HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 953 (1997). Moreover, in those
few states that provide protections against sexual orientation discrimination,
"few plaintiffs will base their case on an exception to the at will doctrine when
their chances of success are usually greater under a statute." Id.
167. Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies For Employment Rights: Prelimi-
nary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457,465-67 (1992).
168. See Bumiller, supra note 163, at 240-41 (stating that antidiscrimination
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elimination of legal barriers in civil rights laws is insufficient to
achieve equality. Victims of discrimination are reluctant to assert the
worthiness of their equality interests and see defeat as inevitable.
Bumiller offers three explanations why this may be so:
First, the bonds between the perpetrator and the discrimina-
tion victim drive the conflict to self-destructive or explosive
reactions. Second, these individuals are guided by an ethic
of survival that encourages self-sacrifice rather than action.
And third, the potential for legal remedies is diminished by
a view of the law that engenders fear of legal intervention.
Injured persons reluctantly employ the label of discrimina-
tion because they shun the role of the victim, and they fear
legal intervention will disrupt the delicate balance of power
between themselves and their opponents.
169
A fourth factor making discrimination difficult to establish
stems from the failure of the law, and of society in general, to prop-
erly conceptualize racism, sexism, and discrimination. The wide-
spread belief that racism, sexism, or homophobia is the result of in-
dividualized, aberrant, and intentional behavior determines the way
in which discrimination is understood in law. Antidiscrimination
laws are designed in part to deter or punish wrongdoers. The focus
on the wrongdoer is perhaps the most fundamental obstacle to ad-
dressing discriminatory behavior in which there is no wrongdoer per
se.170 Systemic racism is not easily identified. The fact that in the
laws rely on the victim to report violations and those groups subject to dis-
crimination are unlikely to report it for legal protection).
169. Id. at 244.
170. See Allan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1053-54 (1978) (criticizing courts for adopting the "per-
petrator's perspective" by focusing on the intent of individual wrongdoers, thus
obscuring systemic or structural discrimination against minorities); see also
McGinley, supra note 27, at 1464. McGinley argues that
the law requires... a moral culprit. To the extent the plaintiff cannot
prove discriminatory intent, the law presumes that no discrimination
has occurred; the individual employer and the rest of society are re-
lieved of moral culpability for the discrimination. Where there is suf-
ficient proof that the employer intentionally discriminated against the
employee, society has found its sinner and can acquit itself of respon-
sibility for racism or sexism. This paradigm encourages an extremely
narrow definition of racism, exonerating any racism that occurs out-
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federal sector African American employees are more likely to be dis-
charged than Whites suggests discrimination, but does not enable one
to detect individualized acts of discrimination. Instead, it appears
that the problem is institutional rather than individual. Even so, there
are studies that suggest that on an individual level, Whites, con-
sciously or unconsciously, harbor racist beliefs about Blacks.171 For
example, in a 1991 survey of Whites' attitudes about Blacks, signifi-
cant numbers of Whites reported anti-Black attitudes. For example,
46.6% of Whites thought Blacks tended to be lazy; 58.9% thought
Blacks preferred welfare; 53.7% thought that Blacks were prone to
violence; and 30.7% believed that Blacks were unintelligent.172 If
these attitudes are present at random in the general population, then
they certainly are part of employers' decisions when dealing with
Blacks.
More difficult in some respects are the discriminatory actions of
employers who are unaware of their own racism. Existing civil
rights laws are not designed to address unconscious racism. As Pro-
fessor Lawrence contends,
side of the narrow confines of an individual's invidious intent.
Id.; see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind", 44
STAN. L. REv. 1, 44 (1991). Gotanda argues that
[d]espite the fact that personal racial prejudices have social origins,
racismis considered [to be] an individual and personal trait. Society's
racism is then vieved as merely the collection, or extension, of per-
sonal prejudices. In the extreme, racism could come to be defined as a
mental illness. These extremely individualized views of racism ex-
clude an understanding [of the fact] that race has institutional or
structural dimensions beyond the formal racial classification.
Id.
171. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination,
141 U. PA. L. REv. 899 (1993) (examining data on racism demonstrating that
discrimination is negligent and not intentional). See also WILLIAM WEI, THE
ASIAN AMERICAN MOVEMENT 47-54 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1993) (discussing
various anti-Asian stereotypes).
172. See ROBERT C. SMITH, RACISM IN THE PosT-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: Now
YOU SEE IT, Now You DON'T 39 (John Howard & Robert C. Smith eds.,
1995) (citing The National Opinion Research Center 1991 General Social Sur-
vey and explaining that figures are higher than figures in a 1978 study survey-
ing White racist attitudes about Blacks); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1167 (1995) (dis-
cussing the distinction between the "real reasonlphony reason" of disparate
treatment).
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Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that deci-
sions about racial matters are influenced in large part by
factors that can be characterized as neither intentional--in
the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously
sought-nor unintentional--in the sense that the outcomes
are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decision-
maker's beliefs, desires, and wishes.
173
Consequently, the courts have been unable to properly address
the "unconscious" component of racism. Professor Krieger discusses
certain statements made by judges that highlight the problem:
Unlike race discrimination, age discrimination may simply
arise from an unconscious application of stereotyped no-
tions of ability rather than a deliberate desire to remove
older employees from the workforce: "Age discrimination
is not the same as the insidious discrimination based on race
or creed prejudices and bigotry. Those discriminations re-
sult in nonemployment because of feelings about a person
entirely unrelated to his ability to do a job. This is hardly a
problem for the older jobseeker. Discrimination arises for
him because of assumptions that are made about the effects
of age on performance.
174
The suppositions of such an analysis are significant. Age dis-
crimination is unconscious; race discrimination, on the other hand, is
the consequence of an overt, conscious desire to act on one's stereo-
typed notion of a particular group rather than an unconscious ten-
dency to attach significance to group membership based on per-
ceived differences between the races.
Title VII jurisprudence is informed by these very notions, and
even today, at the end of the twentieth century, it appears that at-will
employment continues to play a role in the discriminatory discharge
of workers of color. If employers are making decisions based on un-
conscious stereotypes of people of color and women, then even a le-
gal requirement that they provide cause for dismissal will not capture
173. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reck-
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987).
174. Krieger, supra note 172, at 1169 (citing Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler
Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting 113 CONG. REc. 34,742
(1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke))).
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the true reasons for the discharge. Moreover, since direct evidence
of discrimination is unlikely in most cases, default to the at-will pre-
sumption and managerial prerogative makes it difficult for plaintiffs
to win discrimination claims with circumstantial evidence alone.
Studies indicate that in at-will settings, employers use such subjec-
tive job qualifications as "getting along" with customers and "fitting
in" with coworkers to reduce the chances that Blacks will be hired.'
75
There may be similar subjective reasons used to justify firing.176 For
example, in earlier research done on this subject, in both reported la-
bor arbitration decisions and in Canadian human rights decisions, the
reason often given by employers for disciplining or discharging
workers of color who had retaliated against customers or coworkers
who subjected them to racist name-calling was that the minority em-
ployee was unable to "get along" with customers or coworkers.177 In
each case, given the difficulty of proving discrimination, it was evi-
dent that had the employees been employed at-will, they likely
would have had no recourse even though their race may have played
a role in their termination. As Regina Austin explains, workers are
expected to react with "passivity, not insubordination and resistance
.... If [abuse] is intolerable, they should quit and move on to an-
other job."'178 If the abuse to which the employee is subjected stems
from customer or coworker hostility to the employee's race, then so
be it. Peter Fitzpatrick explains:
The unsurpassed aptness of a rejected applicant is not evi-
dence of racial discrimination because she or he may have
175. See Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire
Them, But . . .". The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS 203, 208-21 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
176. See Zwerling & Silver, supra note 134, at 658.
177. See Donna Young & Katherine Liao, The Treatment of Race at Arbi-
tration, in LABOUR ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 57, 66 (William Kaplan et al.
eds., 1992) (describing several cases in which complainants, after being sub-
jected to racist utterances by clients, management, or fellow workers, were
fired for allegedly failing to meet the requirements of the job, including
charges of abrupt and unhelpful behavior towards clients, poor attendance, and
other behavior which arguably stemmed from being the target of racist re-
marks); see also Memorandum from Donna Young, to Anti-Racism Commit-
tee, Ontario Human Rights Commission (Oct. 23, 1992) (on file with author).
178. Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of
IntentionalInfliction ofEmotionalDistress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
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been rejected on other grounds. And such grounds, as tri-
bunals repeatedly recognise, can include the most vague
and the most irrational. Constantly, tribunals uphold em-
ployers' purported rejection of applicants in such terms as
demeanour, personality, ability to fit in and even in terms of
favouritism on the part of the employer. Obviously, ra-
cially-based decisions can be thus justified or obscured with
ease .... [Moreover, tribunals assert] that such decisions
are the prerogative of the employer, that they have to accept
the employer's assessment and even the terms in which it is
made. As a matter of course the impermeability of the em-
ployer's power is affirmed. 79
Accent discrimination cases present unique problems for courts
and are another example of the way in which antidiscrimination laws
fail to protect people of color from discriminatory employment prac-
tices. For the most part, the courts have refused to recognize accent
discrimination as a basis for liability under Title VII. The complex-
ity of this problem has spawned some troubling judicial opinions.
Professor Mari Matsuda explains:
The puzzle in accent cases is that accent is often derivative
of race and national origin. Only Filipino people speak
with Filipino accents. Yet, within the range of employer
prerogatives, it is reasonable to require communication
skills of employees. The claim that accent impedes job
ability is often made with both sincerity and economic ra-
tionality.1
80
After studying the problem, Professor Matsuda concluded that
"accent discrimination is commonplace, natural, and socially accept-
able."' 181 She cites to a Government Accounting Office report that
found "widespread discrimination against 'foreign-sounding' job ap-
plicants as a result of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
179. Peter Fitzpatrick, Racism and the Innocence of Law, 14 J.L. Soc'Y 119,
124 (1987).
180. Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law,
and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1348
(1991) (setting out a compelling critique of the courts' dispositions of accent
discrimination suits).
181. Id.
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1986.7182 For example, "the GAO found that 46% of employers
treated 'foreign-sounding' applicants differently. These findings
were hardly surprising, given the additional survey data showing that
employers, by their own admission, discriminate against 'foreign-
sounding' and 'foreign-looking' applicants."'18 3 Although accent dis-
crimination is common, courts have had difficulty determining when
and whether it stems from motivations unlawful under Title VII.
In order to succeed in Title VII claims, employees must estab-
lish either that their employers were motivated by illegitimate dis-
criminatory factors, or that the employment practice of hiring or re-
taining only those with "standard English" accents had a
discriminatory impact on a racial group or a group of a different na-
tional origin. However, in those instances where employers success-
fully argue that there are business reasons for the discrimination,
employees are left with no form of legal redress, even though the real
reason for the discrimination may have been racial or based on na-
tional origin. Again, existing antidiscrimination laws are blunt in-
struments. They are not effective in parsing the subtle ways in which
employers unlawfully discriminate.
Lamentably, U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence is not of much
use in cases in which the reasons for discharge do not fit nicely
within the current Title VII models. Indeed, as some have argued,
"with the exception of some prominent sex discrimination cases, the
Supreme Court has taught us little in the past twenty-five years about
what discrimination is, how pervasive it is, and how we are to recog-
nize it in the world." 8 4 A recent example of this problem is memo-
rialized in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,185 a case widely criti-
cized for making it difficult for plaintiffs to establish discrimination
under the disparate treatment framework.
In Hicks, the African American plaintiff had filed suit arguing
that his discipline and subsequent discharge were based on his race
182. Id. at 1347 (citing Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1989)).
183. Id. (citing U.S. GEN. AccouNTiNG OFFICE, EMPLOYER SANCTIONS:
COMMENTS ON H.R. 3362-EMPLOYER SANCTIONS IMPROVEMENT ACT §
GGD 90-62 (1990)).
184. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229,2230 (1995).
185. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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in violation of Title VII.' 86 After Hicks had presented evidence suf-
ficient to establish a prima facie case, the burden shifted to his em-
ployer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the dis-
charge.' 87  The employer presented evidence that Hicks was
discharged for repeated rule violations and a poor disciplinary rec-
ord.188 Even though the District Court found that the employer's rea-
sons were pretextual, the Supreme Court held that the case should be
remanded in order for the jury to decide whether Hicks had met his
burden of proving that the real reason for the discharge had been dis-
criminatory. " 9 Under the Hicks analysis then, the plaintiff needs to
show evidence that the employer's explanation was not just pretex-
tual, but that it was a pretext for discrimination. 90 With the Court's
elaboration of the proof required in Title VII litigation, plaintiffs will
no doubt find it much more difficult to succeed if the discrimination
is indirect or too subtle to be detected by the Title VII framework. 191
If this is so, then it appears that the only other alternative would be to
try to fit one's claim into a judicially recognized exception to the at-
will rule. This alternative, however, is fraught with problems.
VII. THE DocTRmiNE's APPEAL To FORMAL EQUALITY:
BARGAINING UNDER ASYMETRIC INFORMATION AND OPPORTUNITY
Justice consists in treating equals equally and unequals
unequally but in proportion to their relevant differences.
This involves, first, the idea of impartiality; the honest
judge considers only the features of the case that are rele-
vant in law. Justice is no respecter of persons; wealth or
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 505, 508.
189. See id. at 524-25.
190. See id. at 515, 524.
191. See McGinley, supra note 27, at 1462, 1482-90 (discussing the various
factors making courts unreceptive to the claims of Title VII litigants). But see
Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimination in a Post-Hicks
Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 49, 84 (1998). Okediji argues that the
Supreme Court was not incorrect in the Hicks decision, but that the res ipsa lo-
quitur procedural framework provides a viable alternative for Title VII cases.
"Where a plaintiff proves the prima facie case and demonstrates that the de-
fendant's proffered reason is pretextual, these facts, in a sense, speak for them-
selves." Id.
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status will influence judgement only if it makes a difference
in law .... Impartiality implies a kind of equality-not
that all cases should be treated alike but that the onus rests
on whoever would treat them differently to distinguish them
in relevant ways.1
92
The above passage exemplifies the theoretical foundation upon
which the law judges the relative equality of persons given the as-
sumptions of formal equality. Differences that are considered "ir-
relevant" to a case must not intrude upon objective judicial decision
making. People are to be seen as featureless or morally indistin-
guishable, divorced from social context and therefore formally equal.
To this end, absent fraud, duress, or incapacity, the law will protect a
bargain entered into by the parties to a contract so long as they are
deemed "equal." The at-will doctrine dictates that either party to an
indefinite employment relationship be free to end the relationship at
any time, for any reason, good or bad, or for no reason at all.
Intuitively, however, one suspects that employer and employee
are unequal in their free capacity to bargain over the terms and con-
ditions of employment, and that this inequality is a product of the
difference in the meaning of the worker's labor to each party. If per-
sonhood is defined through work, then the person who controls work
defines personhood. 193 An involuntary separation from work has a
significant impact on one's personhood. On the other hand, when an
employee voluntarily quits employment, there is no symmetrical
blow to the employer's personhood. Only the personhood of the
worker is made vulnerable at the point of separation. Therefore, if
the law gives an employer the right to dismiss the worker, it puts the
employer in a superior position-one which enables the employer to
define another's personhood.194 The employer controls the terms of
employment, while the employee adheres to those terms.
192. Stanley I. Benn, Justice, in 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 299
(Paul Edwards ed., 1967); see also Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disem-
bodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1331,
1346 (1996) ("By definition, liberal subjects are featureless and thus morally
indistinguishable, divorced from all external context so as to be formally equal.
The subject's featurelessness is the foundation of liberal, formal equality.").
193. See Cornell, supra note 4.
194. See id. at 1614-15, 1620.
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Moreover, consistent with contract law in general, the at-will
doctrine ignores the bargaining endowments of the parties. The law
does not demand substantive parity of bargaining strength in the
making of contracts.'95 The at-will doctrine does not take account of
the different life situations that result in bargaining under asymmetric
information and opportunities. The rule's underlying presumption of
equality between worker and employer must be challenged because
rarely are individual employees in the same economic and political
position to bargain freely as the employers that employ them.' 96 This
observation is not far fetched. Even though the law generally holds
that applicants and employees have no rights to a specific job, there
is a wealth of statutory protections sheltering them from certain em-
ployer treatment. These statutory protections stem from the almost
universally accepted notion that employees require some govern-
mental regulation of the workplace to protect them from employer
abuse and exploitation. In fact, it is not uncommon nowadays to see
the kind of sentiments expressed in the following judicial statement:
I can think of no relationship in which one party, the em-
ployee, places more reliance upon the other, is more de-
pendent upon the other, or is more vulnerable to abuse by
the other, than the relationship between employer and em-
ployee. And, ironically, the relative imbalance of economic
power between employer and employee tends to increase
rather than diminish the longer that relationship continues.
Whatever bargaining strength and marketability the em-
ployee may have at the moment of hiring, diminishes rap-
idly thereafter. Marketplace? What market is there for the
factory worker laid-off after 25 years of labor in the same
195. Letter from Dianne Avery, Vice Dean for Academic Affairs and Profes-
sor of Law, to Harold Dubroff 4 (Jan. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Letter from Di-
anne Avery] (on file with author).
196. To be sure, there are others who argue that the at-will rule makes the
most sense given current economic trends and policies. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 949-50
(1984) (discussing the adherence to the at-will rule when considering the eco-
nomic system); Morriss, supra note 57, at 746-56 (analyzing the influence of
economic and legal conditions on the at-will doctrine).
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plant, or for the middle-aged executive fired after 25 years
with the same firm?
97
Yet, although many would agree that employees are in a weaker
bargaining position than employers, the at-will rule continues to op-
erate as though this were not the case. It is behind this veil of equal-
ity that the at-will doctrine does the most harm, since the impact of
job termination is not similarly felt by employer and employee. Af-
ter termination, the business continues to run, the dismissed em-
ployee is replaced, and any disruption of production eventually
passes. The at-will doctrine's adherence to a formalistic approach to
equality fails to take account of economic and social inequality and
operates in a context in which civil rights laws cannot provide the
necessary protection against discriminatory discharge. If people of
color are disproportionately more likely to be involuntarily dismissed
from their jobs, then they disproportionately require protection
against dismissals.
Of course, there exists the possibility that racial differences in
discharge rates reflect not discrimination but more subtle or unmeas-
ured factors. However, data showing that Blacks are being fired at
higher rates than Whites suggests that race is a factor in job termina-
tions even where race is not identified as a factor by employer, or
employee. Under these circumstances, what would be better is an
employment law regime that would at least partially compensate the
employee for the involuntary dismissal, by requiring notice--or pay
in lieu of notice-even if discrimination has not been proven to be
the basis for the discharge. 198 Because workers of color are at a dis-
proportionate risk of being fired than Whites, it is in their interests
that there be a default rule requiring employers to provide notice--or
pay in lieu of notice-in order to protect them from the full impact of
197. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 718, 765 P.2d 373,
414-15, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 253 (1988) (Kaufian, J., dissenting). Justice
Kaufman is responding to the majority's suggestion that the employee is in a
relatively superior bargaining position vis-a-vis the employer than an insured is
to an insurer. This is allegedly so because the employee has the opportunity to
seek employment elsewhere after a breach in the employment contract,
whereas an insured "cannot turn to the marketplace" to find another insurance
company willing to pay for the loss already incurred.
198. This is the model followed in Canada and other conmon-law countries.
See INNIS CHRISTIE, EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CANADA 338 (1980).
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termination. The at-will default, on the other hand, does not guard
against the free fall that is job termination.
Laws regulating one's ability to work are of fundamental im-
portance. In light of this, the question of how the law should address
claims of undeserved dismissal must be reconsidered. Innovative
approaches that respond to the complexities of employment dismissal
cases are necessary given the failure of the at-will doctrine to ade-
quately deal with such complexity. So, for example, where the at-
will doctrine requires that employers and employees be given the
same opportunity to quit the employment relationship, an approach
based on substantive equality principles would recognize that the in-
herently unequal relationship between employer and employee re-
quires different treatment, i.e., one in which only employees be given
protection against dismissal.
I argue that this would require that employers give notice or pay
in lieu of notice of dismissal, while no such reciprocal notice re-
quirement be demanded of employees in exercising their right to
quit. This lack of reciprocity is required if the law is to take account
of the asymmetry in bargaining parity. This approach is not without
precedent. Canadian equality jurisprudence has recognized that in
certain cases, treating people the same results in unequal treatment.
In order for the law to correct the imbalance, therefore, it must allow
for differential treatment.
VIII. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JOB TERMINATION:
CANADIAN LAW AND "SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY"
The persistence of the at-will doctrine in defining the nature of
the employment relationship for most private sector employees' 99 in
the United States remains an important factor distinguishing U.S.
employment relations law from the law of other industrialized na-
tions.20 ' The manner in which a country regulates employment rela-
tions reveals much about the social and economic values it places on
199. But see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -913 (2000). Montana is the
only state that has adopted legislation establishing a just-cause standard for
private sector employees.
200. See Summers, Worker Dislocation, supra note 61, at 1039-53, 1058-59
(explaining that the default rule in many European countries provides better
protections against arbitrary dismissal than does the at-will doctrine).
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one's capacity to work.201 As is often the case, United States courts
would do well to examine legal developments in other countries.
But, because employment at-will is so deeply imbedded in U.S.
common law, it is perhaps difficult to foresee its demise as a result of
the legal paradigms of other countries. It has generally been the case
that American courts are reluctant to cross national borders to seek
foreign or international models. There are some who defend this in-
ternal focus. For example, Professors Freed and Polsby contend that
those who call for the abolition of employment at-will based on the
experiences of foreign law depend upon dubious assumptions, and
that "[n]o other countries have a job security scheme that is worth
emulating in the United States" :202
The foreign experience is obviously foreign. Even if it
were true that another country's scheme was worth emu-
lating in America, such a scheme probably would not sur-
vive transplantation .... The entire purpose and meaning
of work, and of the coordination mechanisms that make
work possible, are culturally determined. Moreover, the
meaning of justice, and perhaps of efficiency, is culturally
loaded .... It is illogical to use data from a foreign culture
to formulate prescriptive statements about organization in
the United States. For this reason, any statement may be
dismissed that states: "Because Japan does X, it follows
that the United States should do X.
',203
201. See SECRETARIAT, COMM'N FOR LABOR COOPERATION, PRELIMINARY
REPORT TO THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL ON LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS LAW IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXIco 2-3 (1996)
("The individual employment relationship is critical in establishing the frame-
work for development of collective labor ights .... How a country formu-
lates its job security system reflects the relative value accorded to employment
stability for workers versus responsiveness to market conditions for employ-
ers.").
202. Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Causefor Termination Rules
and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMoRY L.J. 1097, 1140 n.58 (1989). But see
Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J.
COMP. L. 310, 317 (1985) (noting that "in many ways, post-World War II la-
bor law in Japan began with the American model, and thus the Japanese expe-
rience should teach us something about the role ofsocio-cultural variables").
203. Freed & Polsby, supra note 202, at 1140-42.
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In like manner, one might argue that the unique history and cir-
cumstances of the United States makes it ill-suited for ready com-
parisons with legal developments in other countries. Professor Es-
treicher cautions us against the wholesale adoption of a foreign
employment scheme, pointing out that differences in language and
sociocultural differences in foreign countries may create difficulties
in transferring different models to the American context. Despite
these difficulties, however, he suggests that we pursue comparative
studies in order to "reexamine deeply embedded assumptions about
our own employment law system.,20 4 I fully appreciate the potential
problems associated with comparative approaches to domestic law.
Nonetheless, the reluctance to take account of foreign models is
frustrating when international models provide compelling alterna-
tives.205 It is fitting to have a more global vision of law so as to en-
courage American lawmakers to design the best possible system of
workplace regulation. United States lawmakers would do well to
keep abreast of employment law in Canada, for example. Of all the
legal systems in the world, Canada's employment law is the most
appropriate for American emulation.206 Canada's similar cultural
determinations about the meaning of work, justice, equality, and effi-
ciency may assuage those who are concerned about problems of
transplantability.
This is not to say that we should turn a blind eye to legal devel-
opments in countries other than Canada, for there is real value in
putting into comparative context the uniquely American presumption
of employment at-will. Compared to industrial models in other na-
tions, the United States' regulatory scheme governing nonunionized
employees' privileges economic or property interests over the social
204. Estreicher, supra note 202, at 311.
205. In fact, as is the case with other aspects of U.S. labor law, the at-will
rule has influenced employment law principles in Canada and elsewhere. With
one important modification, Canadian law has also applied the at-will doc-
trine's durational basis for defining employment contracts. That is, an em-
ployment contract of indefinite duration is one which is terminable by either
party. However, a notice requirement has been implemented, including
monetary compensation in lieu of notice for terminations undertaken absent
just-cause. In most Canadian provinces, a dismissed worker is entitled to one
month notice or pay in lieu of notice for every year worked.
206. See id. (stating that similarities in legal culture and collective bargain-
ing systems make Canada a promising comparison).
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interests of continued employment. "[W]e seem to stand virtually
alone among the nations of the western industrialized world in not
providing general protection against unjust discharge for private-
sector employees who either cannot or do not choose unionism."
207
In contrast, international/foreign models that recognize the impor-
tance of protecting workers from unjust or arbitrary dismissals
abound. For example, the International Labor Organization's Termi-
nation of Employment Convention of 1982 recognizes that "[t]he
employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a
valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or
conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of
the undertaking, establishment or service. 205 Mexico's constitution
and labor laws require employers to discharge only for 'just-cause"
regardless of whether workers belong to a labor union.209 Germany's
dismissal statute is premised upon the notion that a person has a right
to continued employment and that dismissals that are "socially un-
justified" are legally void.210 Great Britain's system provides statu-
tory protections from unfair dismissals for virtually every employee
and requires employers to show legitimate reasons for dismissal,
"such as lack of competence, misconduct or 'some other substantial
reason of a kind to justify' dismissal" 211 The Swedish system is
207. Id.
208. 3 INT'L LABOUR ORG., INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, 1977-1995, at art. 4 (1982) (stating that only twenty-
seven countries have ratified this convention, not including the United States
or Canada); see also id. at art. 5 (outlining invalid reasons for termination such
as union membership, seeking office or acting in the capacity of a workers rep-
resentative, discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, marital status, etc.).
209. This just-cause requirement is just one of several minimum conditions
legally available to Mexican workers. However, as strong as Mexico's worker
protections are, they are often not enforced against unscrupulous business
owners and multinational corporations that set up production in Mexico to take
advantage of trade benefits and the government's lax enforcement of labor
laws. Therefore, any social value placed on job security by Mexican law is
undermined by Mexico's terrible record of enforcement.
210. See Summers, Worker Dislocation, supra note 61, at 1043 (discussing
the fact that in Germany job security is provided for by statute and not by col-
lective agreement); see also Estreicher, supra note 202, at 314-15 (explaining
that "socially unwarranted dismissals... [are] not based on reasons connected
with the person or [his or her conduct] ... or on urgent social needs that pre-
clude [his or her] continued employment").
211. Estreicher, supra note 202, at 313; see also Summers, Worker Disloca-
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based on the policy that employers have a social responsibility for
employees, and that employees cannot be dismissed absent "objec-
tive cause., 212 Italy entitles terminated employees severance pay and
advance notice of termination. 3  Finally, Japan's constitution de-
clares the right to work a fundamental human right, thereby placing
upon the government the burden of finding work for those willing to
work.
2 14
It would be refreshing if U.S. law were to come to reflect some
of the principles enunciated in these foreign systems of employment
relations.2 1 5 With respect to the at-will doctrine, the ability to dis-
charge an employee is, with some notable exceptions, unimpeded.
Unfortunately, given the historical reluctance on the part of Congress
and of the judiciary to cross national borders for models of law re-
form, it is doubtful that this will change despite regional labor law
schemes, such as NAFTA, that offer a more integrated approach.
Given the global integration of regional and world markets, the
tion, supra note 61, at 1039 (stating that the United Kingdom has forgone the
common-law doctrine of employment at-will in favor of a statutory system re-
quiring fairness).
212. Summers, Worker Dislocation, supra note 61, at 1048 (stating that the
statutory provisions in Sweden afford more protection to workers than "just-
cause" clauses).
213. See Estreicher, supra note 202, at 316.
214. See Summers, Worker Dislocation, supra note 61, at 1053.
215. However, this is not to say that any one country has necessarily "gotten
it right." Women the world over are more likely than men to suffer in poverty.
Racial, ethnic, religious minorities, and indigenous people across the globe are
subject to discrimination, oppression, and persecution. Nowhere have progres-
sive labor protections brought these groups out of their subordinate roles in so-
ciety. Mexico is a good example: the law on the books reflects a progressive
vision of employment relations, yet in practice, workers there are worse off
than those in countries where labor laws are not as substantively protective but
are more widely enforced. For example, in Mexico, complaints about sexual
harassment, pregnancy discrimination, and other forms of sex discrimination
are often interpreted by government agencies in a way which perpetuates the
discriminatory treatment of female workers. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
MEXICO: A JOB OR YOUR RIGHTS: CONTINUED SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
MEXICO'S MAQUILADORA SECTOR, available at http://www.hnv.org/
hrw/reports98/women2/maqui98d-O1.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2000). Nev-
ertheless, my purpose here is not to point out the myriad ways in which differ-
ent countries' legal systems are designed and implemented so as to perpetuate
oppression and subordination, but merely to suggest that there may be better
legal models than our own for achieving fair and just employment relations.
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United States would benefit from a comparative approach to its do-
mestic labor and employment scheme. That is why it is incumbent
on labor activists, academics, and lawyers to inform ourselves about
foreign and international legal approaches, and to work toward re-
forming American employment regulation.
Canadian employment law, an obvious but neglected source of
information for American courts, lawyers, and legal scholars, offers
an interesting and compelling comparison. Given Canada's geo-
graphic proximity, its mutual economic dependency, its similar labor
and immigration histories, and the centrality of the common law in
the two countries, it would appear that Canadian and U.S. lawyers
would benefit from more comprehensive study of each other's legal
systems.216 Canadian and United States labor and employment laws
derive from the same common-law roots. Like the U.S. at-will doc-
trine, employment contracts in Canada are defined according to the
duration of the employment contract. In both the United States and
Canada, if an employment contract is one of definite duration, then
an employer, public or private, in order to avoid a breach of contract
claim must dismiss the employee only for cause.
Yet, the common law in the two countries relating to employ-
ment contracts of indefinite duration has taken divergent paths. Can-
ada developed a system of employment law that favored giving no-
tice to dismissed employees. 217 In Canada, an employment contract
216. As compared to the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
Canada has been much more willing to refer to international and foreign laws
when engaging in constitutional interpretation. For example, Justice La Forest,
a former justice on the Supreme Court of Canada, acknowledged the influence
that foreign models have had on Charter interpretation, allowing the court to
interpret equality issues from a multidimensional perspective. See G6rard La
Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. L. REV.
211, 212-13 (1994) (explaining that Canada has a "sincere outward-looldng
interest in the views of other societies, especially those with traditions similar
to ours").
217. Canadian labor law is regulated by each province individually, or in the
case of federal employees, by the federal government So, each jurisdiction is
free to provide different degrees of protection. The Canadian government and
two of its provinces have established legislation protecting nonunion workers
from unjust or wrongful discharge. Typically, though, an employer must pro-
vide minimum notice or pay in lieu of notice. The length of notice is deter-
mined by custom, but failure to give proper notice constitutes wrongful dis-
missal. Findings of wrongful dismissal are generally addressed through
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for an indefinite period--defining an at-will contract in the United
States-is terminable without cause only upon reasonable notice,
absent express contractual language to the contrary."' The reason-
able notice requirement is to be implied as a contractual term in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Therefore, unlike the American
rule, where the presumption is in favor of at-will employment, the
Canadian rule favors a presumption of reasonable notice, rebuttable
if the employment contract specifies, either expressly or impliedly,
some other period of notice.219 What constitutes reasonable notice
varies depending on the circumstances of each case.220
In addition to the Canadian common-law, each province has its
own legislation covering notice requirements in involuntary dismiss-
als. Therefore, the requirement that an employer give notice to a dis-
charged worker is derived from both Canadian common law and
provincial legislation. For example, in Ontario, the Employment
Standards Act221 provides for mandatory minimum notice periods.
222
judicial orders requiring payment, not reinstatement. See supra note 189 and
accompanying text.
218. See Carter v. Bell & Sons Ltd., [1936] O.R. 290 (Can.).
219. See Machtinger v. HOJ Indus. Ltd., [1992] S.C.R. 986, 987 (Can.); see
also CHRISTIE, supra note 198, at 347 (stating that almost all Canadian juris-
dictions have a minimum notice period); M.R. FREEDLAND, THE CONTRACT
OF EMPLOYMENT 153 (1976) ("the pattern of contract now generally accepted
and applied by the courts in the absence of evidence to the contrary is one of
employment for an indefinite period terminable by either party upon reason-
able notice, but only upon reasonable notice").
220. See Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd., [1960] D.L.R.2d 140 (Can.). Bardal
holds that there can be no catalogue laid down as to what is reasonable notice
in any particular case. According to the court, the "[r]easonableness of the no-
tice must be determined in each case by reference to the character of the em-
ployment, the length of service, the age of the employee and the availability of
similar employment, having regard to the experience, training and qualifica-
tions of the servant." Id.
221. Employment Standards Act, R.S.O., ch. E-14 (1990) (Can.).
222. Section 57(14) states that
[w]here the employment of an employee is terminated contrary to this
section, (a) the employer shall pay termination pay in an amount equal
to the wages that the employee would have been entitled to receive at
his or her regular rate for a regular non-overtime work week for the
period of notice prescribed by subsection (1) or (2), and any wages to
which the employee is entitled.
Id. § 57(14). Section 57(1) states:
No employer shall terminate the employment of an employee who has
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In general, notice of termination will be given to workers who have
been employed for three months or more. Notice is not required in
most jurisdictions, however, for employees who have been laid off
temporarily, or for those who have been dismissed for cause. Inter-
estingly, under the common law, professional and managerial em-
ployees usually command longer notice periods than workers with
fewer skills or responsibility.22 Consequently, to the extent that em-
ployment standards legislation departs from this common-law norm,
it has the effect of expanding protections unavailable to blue-collar
or low-skilled workers under the common law. Nonetheless, the no-
tice periods under the provincial acts may be and often are shorter
than those available under the common law where flexibility has
been built into the definition of "reasonable." Statutory notice provi-
sions are minimum requirements only, allowing for the common law
presumption of "reasonable notice" to be incorporated into the Act
through judicial interpretation.224 As a consequence, interesting
been employed for three months or more unless the employer gives,
(a) one weeks notice in writing to the employee if his or her period of
employment is less than one year;, (b) two weeks notice in writing to
the employee if his or her period of employment is one year or more
but less than three years; (c) three weeks notice in writing to the em-
ployee if his or her period of employment is three years or more but
less than four years; (d) four weeks notice in writing to the employee
if his or her period of employment is four years or more but less than
five years; (e) five weeks notice in writing to the employee if his or
her period of employment is five years or more but less than six years;
(f) six weeks notice in writing to the employee if his or her period of
employment is six years or more but less than seven years; (g) seven
weeks notice in writing to the employee if his or her period of em-
ployment is seven years or more but less than eight years; (h) eight
weeks notice in writing to the employee if his or her period of em-
ployment is eight years or more, and such notice has expired.
See id. § 57(1).
223. See HUMAN RES. DEv. CAN., TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT, avail-
able at http://labour-travail.hrdc-drhe.gc.ca/policy/leglelstandll-el.html (last
visited Sept. 22,2000).
224. [T]he minimum notice periods set out in the Act do not operate to
displace the presumption at common law of reasonable notice. Section
6 of the Act states that the Act does not affect the right of an employee
to seek a civil remedy from his or her employer. Section 4(2) states that
a "right, benefit term or condition of employment under a contract"
that provides a greater benefit to an employee than the standards set out
in the Act shall prevail over the standards in the Act. I have no
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questions are raised about the manner in which the law should treat
employment contracts that provide for notice periods shorter than the
statutory minimum Should effect be given to the parties' intentions,
to provincial legislation, or to common law norms?
These were the questions raised in Machtinger v. HOJ Indus-
225~ ~ htries, in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that where an
employment contract stipulates a period of notice less than that re-
quired by the Ontario Act, an employee who is discharged without
cause is entitled to reasonable notice of termination pursuant to
common law, not the shorter notice requirement contained in the
Act.2 26 The case involved the involuntary discharge of two employ-
ees who had entered into written agreements with their employers.227
The agreements provided for zero and two weeks notice for each
employee respectively. 228 The Ontario Employment Standards Act
would have required at least four weeks notice for each, 29 while the
common law would have required "reasonable" notice-in this case
seven or more months. °
Interestingly, the court chose to make the employee's perspec-
tive central to its analysis of the problem. The court acknowledged
the importance of job termination and expressed a concern for the
"economic and psychological" welfare of employees:
The law governing termination of employment is obviously
of significant importance to an individual worker, for the
degree of job security which he is assured depends upon the
ease with which the law allows his employer to terminate
his employment. Discharge has serious financial
difficulty in concluding that the common law presumption of
reasonable notice is a "benefit", [sic] which, if the period of notice
required by the common law is greater than that required by the Act,
will, if otherwise applicable, prevail over the notice period set out in the
Act. Any possible doubt on this question is dispelled by s. 4(1) of the
Act, which expressly deems the employment standards set out in the
Act to be minimum requirements only.
Machtinger v. HOJ Indus. Ltd., [1992] S.C.R. 986, 999-1000 (Can.).
225. [1992] S.C.R. 986 (Can.).
226. See id. at 1004.
227. See id. at 986, 991.
228. See id. at 1007.
229. See Employment Standards Act, R.S.O., ch. 137, § 40(l)(c) (1980)
(Can.).
230. SeeMachtinger, [1992] S.C.R. at 1007.
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ramifications for the individual in that it puts an end to re-
muneration, as well as to less quantifiable economic bene-
fits such as accrued seniority. Discharge can have ongoing
financial effects, as well, for the reason given for termina-
tion (if any) may affect accessibility to future jobs as well
as entitlement to government benefits such as unemploy-
ment insurance. The psychological effects of discharge are
also important, because of the disruption in the individual's
life caused by seeking new employment and establishing
himself in a new environment.
231
This approach accomplishes several things: it makes clear that
the purpose behind regulation of the employment relationship is to
protect workers; it acknowledges that the manner in which employ-
ment comes to an end affects the worker's economic and psychologi-
cal interests; and it recognizes the relative asymmetry in bargaining
power between employer and employee. This last point is crucial in
understanding the different theoretical baselines in Canadian and
U.S. employment regulation. Where the at-will doctrine presumes
equality in bargain, the Canadian notice requirement presumes ine-
quality in freedom to bargain between employer and employee. As
the courts stated,
The objective of the Act is to protect the interests of em-
ployees by requiring employers to comply with certain
minimum standards, including minimum periods of notice
of termination .... The harm which the Act seeks to rem-
edy is that individual employees, and in particular non-
unionized employees, are often in an unequal bargaining
position in relation to their employers. 2
Moreover, "most individual employees are unaware of their legal
rights, or unwilling or unable to go to the trouble and expense of
having them vindicated. Employers can rely on the fact that many
employees will not challenge contractual notice provisions which are
in fact contrary to employment standards legislation."'2
33
231. Id. at 991 (quoting Katherine Swinton, Contract Lmv and the Employ-
ment Relationship: The Proper Forum for Reform, in STUDIES IN CONTRACT
LAw 357, 360-61 (Barry J. Reiter & John Swan eds., 1980)).
232. Id. at 1003 (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 1004.
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This approach is quite different from the approach taken in the
United States. The employment at-will doctrine requires employee
and employer to be treated as equals in their decisions to end the em-
ployment relationship. However, the Supreme Court of Canada sug-
gests that, for the most part, employees are not "equal" to employers
in terms of bargaining strength and therefore should be spared the
burden of establishing whether there has been an unjust separation.
In other words, the Canadian default rule presupposes inequality in
bargaining power and requires employers to compensate discharged
workers. Accordingly, the Canadian Supreme Court's interpretation
of employment contracts of indefinite duration provides more pro-
tection for workers than does the at-will doctrine. However, is the
Canadian approach fairer? In order to answer this question, one must
grapple with different conceptions of equality, namely, how are em-
ployer and employee to be treated in order to treat them equally? In
the United States, the at-will doctrine requires similarity in treatment:
employers and employees must be given the same opportunity to quit
the relationship at any time, without reason or notice. Canadian
equality jurisprudence provides a different model, one which re-
quires an analysis of the employment relationship based on princi-
ples of substantive equality.
234
The Canadian Supreme Court radically departs from the U.S.
Supreme Court's approach to "equality" and has the potential to
achieve the appropriate balance between the interests of employers
and employees. The at-will doctrine reinforces existing power im-
balances by superimposing formal equality onto a relationship that is
substantively unequal. In contrast, the Canadian approach has a re-
distributive purpose, one that explicitly requires notice only from
employers. No such requirement is imposed upon workers.2 35 In or-
der to quell fears by employers that employees will leave as soon as
234. This approach is not uniquely Canadian. In fact, the substantive equal-
ity approach has been advocated by several prominent American legal aca-
demics. For example, Professor Neil Gotanda argues that the Supreme Court
has lost sight of the context or "social reality" in which racial classification is
analyzed. See Gotanda, supra note 170.
235. Only after an employer has given the employee notice must the em-
ployee provide some notice if he/she intends to quit before the notice period
has expired. See, e.g., Employment Standards Act, R.S.O., ch. E-14, § 57(15)
(1990) (Can.).
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they receive notice, the Ontario Employment Standards Act, for ex-
ample, requires employees to provide notice only after having been
given notice of termination.236 This approach clearly recognizes that
a formally equal treatment of employer and employee would offend
the very equality principles that the Supreme Court of Canada has so
painstakingly set out to distinguish itself from the American formal
equality approach.
In its first major decision interpreting the equality provisions of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 37 the Supreme Court
of Canada, in Andreivs v. Law Societ. of British Cohnibia,238 exam-
ined the validity of an analytical approach that defines conventional
equality law as stemming from a theory of formal equality originat-
ing from the Aristotelian concept that "[e]quality consists in the same
treatment of similar persons. 239
Under the influence of Aristotle, equality as such in law has
come to mean treating likes alike and unalikes unalike. If
one is the same, one is to be treated the same; if one is dif-
ferent, one is to be treated differently. The concept is
236. The Act states:
An employee to whom notice has been given under subsection (2)
shall not terminate his or her employment until after the expiry of, (a)
one weeks notice in writing to the employer if the period of employ-
ment is less than two years; or (b) two weeks notice in writing to the
employer if the period of employment is two years or more, unless the
employer has been guilty of a breach of the terms and conditions of
employment.
Id.
237. The equality guarantees of the Charter are contained in section 15:
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without dis-
crimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physi-
cal disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that
has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged...
because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 15.
238. [1989] S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
239. ARISTOTLE'S POLrTCs 307 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943).
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empirical (how one ought to be treated is based on the way
one is) .... 240
In striking down provincial legislation that required Canadian
citizenship for entry into the legal profession, the Supreme Court in
Andrews recognized that in order to treat different people equally,
the law sometimes had to treat them differently. The court stated
that the Aristotelian principle of equality was "seriously deficient"
241
and that "mere equality of application to similarly situated groups or
individuals does not afford a realistic test for violation of equality
rights. 2 42 Further, the court stated that not every distinction made
by law would constitute discrimination as contemplated by the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Discrimination was defined as
a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on
grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual
or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obliga-
tions, or disadvantages on such individual or group not im-
posed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to
opportunities, benefits, and advantages to other members of
243society.
Of great significance is that the focus of the inquiry, rights of
citizenship, was not a ground that was enumerated in the Charter.
The court had no problem interpreting the significance of this right
since citizenship was considered to be analogous to the grounds
enumerated in the Charter. The court reasoned that, "[t]he grounds
of discrimination enumerated in s. 15(1) are not exhaustive. Grounds
analogous to those enumerated are also covered and the section may
be even broader than that .... ,a The "analogous grounds" doctrine
has enabled the court to expand its constitutional reach beyond what
is possible in the United States. Moreover, although the Andrews
decision discussed equality in the context of a discrimination case,
the court has been quite willing to discuss equality in a number of
other contexts, adding support to the claim that equality principles
240. CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, SEX EQUALITY 4 (1999).
241. Andrews, [1989] S.C.R. at 166 (McIntyre, J., dissenting in part).
242. Id. at 167.
243. Id. at 174.
244. Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
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must be elaborated and developed in judicial application of employ-
ment at-wilL
245
Ironically, the closest equivalent to American-style at-will em-
ployment in Canadian law is found in regulation of certain civil
service positions, not in regulation of the private sector workforce.
Those who are employed "at the pleasure" of the Crown, as defined
in federal and provincial legislation, are not afforded common-law or
legislative notice protections against unjustified dismissal. The re-
sult is that some nonunionized government employees are worse off
than their unionized or private sector counterparts. Interestingly, this
differential treatment has been attacked on the theory that the equal-
ity provisions in the Charter were meant to protect against differen-
tial treatment based on employment status. In Leyte v. Neifound-
land,24 the Supreme Court of Newfoundland took its cue from
Supreme Court of Canada equality jurisprudence and held that leg-
islation allowing for the hiring of civil servants at pleasure was un-
constitutional since it violated employees' equality rights.247
Over a twenty-eight year period, the plaintiff in Leyte had held
several positions with the Ministry of Social Services. 248 At the time
of his dismissal he was district manager in one of the Ministry's
branch offices.249  He was given reasons for his dismissal even
though he was employed "at pleasure," which meant that the defen-
dant need not provide notice or reasons for dismissal. 250 He argued
that as a result of his dismissal, the legislation upon which the Min-
istry had relied had allowed it to allege improprieties on the part of
the plaintiff, "eradicat[ed]" his employability, denied him severance
benefits, and restricted his opportunity to obtain pension benefits.
25'
In addition, he argued that the at-pleasure doctrine was "antiquated,
245. See also Machtinger v. HOJ Indus. Ltd., [1992] S.C.R. 986, 1002-05
(Can.) (discussing policy considerations including equality principles in em-
ployment contracts).
246. [1997] D.L.R.4th 739 (Can.), overruled on different grounds by New-
foundland (Minister of Social Services) v. Leyte, [1998] C.R.R.2d 114 (Can.).
247. See id. at 762.
248. See id. at 742.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 745.
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anachronistic and unfair 252 and that it violated the equality provi-
sions of the Charter. The Newfoundland Supreme Court agreed. It
held that the characteristic of being employed at pleasure constitutes
a ground of discrimination within the ambit and purview of the
equality provisions of the Charter.
[D]iscrimination on the basis of employment at pleasure af-
fects the essential dignity and self-esteem or worth of an in-
dividual in the same way as do other recognized grounds of
distinction which violate recognized standards of human
rights. It affects an individual's right to bargain freely with
the employer in an effort to ameliorate working conditions
and places him or her completely under the dominance and
control of the employer, taking away the right to proof of
just cause or due notice. The rights given to others or ne-
gotiated by others working with the same employer is de-
nied to the person employed "at pleasure."
253
The court in Leyte accomplished at least three things. It held
that employment status constitutes a ground analogous to those enu-
merated in the equality provisions of the Charter; it elevated the just-
cause and notice requirement to the level of a "right"; and it held that
the at-pleasure delineation constitutes discrimination under the
Charter.254
These points are important. Leyte and Machtinger recognize the
inherent inequality in bargaining power between employee and em-
ployer, elevate the issue of employment status to constitutional di-
mensions, provide an alternative model and rationale for replacing
employment at-will, encourage us to see employment in the context
of a history of inequality between parties, and urge the state to take a
more active role in protecting employees, thereby "casting the state
in the benevolent role of attempting to ensure a society in which the
vulnerable as well as the powerful can be free. 255 Moreover, the
cases offer a different view of governmental intrusion, one that dis-
misses the viewpoint that any regulation is an exercise of illegitimate
252. Id.
253. Id. at 754.
254. See id. at 762.
255. Moran, supra note 41, at 1486.
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favoritism, and argues rather that governmental action is necessary to
assure respect for human dignity and equality.
Examining the way in which Canadian courts treat employment
contracts of indefinite duration is fruitful. Canada's notice require-
ments confer upon Canadian workers a substantial benefit not en-
joyed by their counterparts in the United States. Not only does Can-
ada follow a common-law tradition of providing notice to employees
with indefinite term contracts, but provincial legislation adds to that
protection by mandating minimum notice requirements. The fact
that the Canadian and U.S. common-law of employment relations
developed in different ways is interesting. The existence of an alter-
native approach in a society very much like the United States, with a
similar history, culture, economic system, and common-law tradi-
tion, is a strong indication that there is nothing inevitable about the
employment at-will doctrine. To the extent that at-will dismissals
may have a disproportionate impact on people of color and women,
the Canadian requirement of notice provides at least some economic
compensation for dismissals that are not otherwise recognized by the
crude tools available for discerning discrimination in American anti-
discrimination law.
IX. EFFICIENCY, RATIONALITY, FUNGIBILITY, AND JUST-CAUSE:
THE CASE FOR MANDATORY NOTICE
What then should be the law's objective in regulating the em-
ployment relationship? Much debate has arisen with respect to that
question. On one side are those who argue for minimal legal inter-
ference in the private relationship between employer and employee;
on the other side are those who believe that state intervention is nec-
essary to protect employees from labor markets that are inhospitable
to worker interests like job security.
256
Arguments in favor of the at-will rule are often found in the law
and economics literature exemplified in the work of Richard Ep-
stein,257 Richard Posner,2 8 and others.219  Lamentably, the
256. See Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52
FORDHAM L. REv. 1082, 1108 (1984) (emphasizing that the contract of em-
ployment should be the central focus of labor law).
257. Perhaps the best known proponent of the law and economics approach
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emergence of the law and economics literature, with its emphasis on
the economic basis of employment at-will, has obscured the more
fundamental human and personal interests at stake in the loss of em-
ployment. Nonetheless, the law and economics movement has had
an impact on judicial opinion in this area and therefore should be ad-
dressed. Much of the law and economics scholarship claims that
employers will not dismiss good workers without good reason be-
cause to do so is inefficient. The costs associated with finding, se-
lecting, and training replacement workers are said to deter discharges
based upon irrational factors or upon the personal whims of manag-
ers. For example, Epstein argues that workers are not fungible and
that unjustified dismissal is therefore inefficient:
The reason why these contracts at will are effective is pre-
cisely that the employer must always pay an implicit price
when he exercises his right to fire. He no longer has the
right to compel the employee's service, as the employee can
enter the market to find another job. The costs of the em-
ployer's decision therefore are borne in large measure by
the employer himself, creating an implicit system of coin-
surance between employer and employee against employer
abuse. Nor, it must be stressed, are the costs to the em-
ployer light. It is true that employees who work within a
firm acquire specific knowledge about its operation and
to employment regulation is Richard Epstein. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION
LAWS 59-78 (1992) (arguing for the elimination of antidiscrimination laws be-
cause some discrimination is rational and can result in more efficient work
places); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique
of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983) (arguing
that labor legislation should be abandoned in favor of common law); Epstein,
supra note 196, at 947 (asserting a defense of the at-will doctrine).
258. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 358-59 (5th
ed. 1998) (arguing, inter alia, that job security is not really efficient).
259. See, e.g., Freed & Polsby, supra note 202, at 1097-98 (arguing that de-
spite some erosion the at-will rule still applies); Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 1913, 1915-17 (1996) (comparing the "norm of discharge" for
cause with the legal rule "employment at will" and considering whether society
should enforce the norm or the law); Verkerke, supra note 16, at 838 (advo-
cating a reaffirmation of the at-will doctrine by the courts and abandoning ter-
mination for good cause).
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upon dismissal can transfer only a portion of that knowl-
edge to the new job. Nonetheless, the problem is roughly
symmetrical, as the employer must find, select, and train a
replacement worker who may not turn out to be better than
the first employee. Workers are not fungible, and sorting
them out may be difficult: resumes can be misleading, if
not fraudulent; references may be only too eager to unload
an unsuitable employee; training is expensive; and the new
worker may not like the job or may be forced to move out
of town. In any case, firms must bear the costs of voluntary
turnover by workers who quit, which gives them a frequent
reminder of the need to avoid self-inflicted losses. The in-
stitutional stability of employment contracts at will can now
be explained in part by their legal fragility. The right to fire
is exercised only infrequently because the threat of firing is
effective.260
If one assesses Epstein's argument from the perspective of peo-
ple of color and women, then the fallacy of Epstein's assertions, that
"workers are not fungible" and that the cost of training effectively
deters irrational firings, is made apparent. One must look at the en-
tire labor market to see where women and minorities are concen-
trated. Fungibility is a function of the type of work performed.
Skilled and semiskilled positions involve higher training costs than
low-skilled positions. It is well documented that White men are con-
centrated in the skilled and semiskilled jobs and that women and men
of color are disproportionately represented in the unskilled areas. In
the jobs that are likely to be held by women and minorities, little
training is provided and the cost of replacing a fired worker is low.
Therefore, it is precisely in jobs with high concentrations of men of
color and women that employees are indeed fungible. For these vul-
nerable workers, at-will employment does not deter unjustified dis-
missals.26'
There is also the rather circular suggestion in the law and eco-
nomics literature that suggests that at-will employment is efficient
260. Epstein, supra note 196, at 973-74.
261. See Comell, supra note 4, at 1616 (arguing that with respect to un-
skilled positions, employers are not deterred from abusing the employment at-
will doctrine).
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because it is "the usual form of labor contract in the United
States."262 Its prevalence is taken as evidence of its mutual desir-
ability since both employees and employers freely assent to at-will
arrangements. Thus, as Richard Posner suggests, most workers
would not benefit from a system that required the employer to pro-
vide good reasons for discharge:
[I]f the requirement were optimal it would be negotiated
voluntarily. These are not the . . . information problems
that might defeat transactions over workplace safety ... for
discharges are not such rare events that workers can't be
expected to evaluate the risk rationally. If such a require-
ment is not negotiated voluntarily, presumably this is be-
cause the cost to the employer of showing good cause for
getting rid of an incompetent employee is greater than the
benefit to the worker of being thus insured against unjust
discharge beyond the insurance provided by his firm-
specific human capital. The extra cost of an employment
contract is a labor cost and will thus reduce the amount that
the employer ... [can] pay in wages, in just the same way
that increasing the employer's social security tax will re-
duce the wage the employer is willing to pay.
263
Thus, the status quo becomes the benchmark measure of effi-
ciency. Even those who defend the at-will rule would concede, how-
ever, that if employees do suffer from information deficits at the time
of employment, then they are not likely to try to negotiate for better
contractual terms.2 64 Therefore, the fact that at-will contracts are
prevalent does not necessarily establish efficiency. Professor Pauline
262. POSNER, supra note 258, at 358 (arguing that "[a]nother bit of evidence
that job security is not really efficient is that outside of the unionized sector...
and government employment.., employment at will is the usual form of labor
contract in the United States"); see also Epstein, supra note 196, at 955 (stating
that "employers and employees know the footing on which they have con-
tracted: the phrase 'at will' is two words long and has the convenient virtue of
meaning just what it says, no more and no less").
263. POSNER, supra note 258, at 359.
264. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Employment Contract Law, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 47, 52 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998) (stating that "[i]f employees are so poorly informed about the legal
rules governing employment terminations, then it is much harder to argue that
they will accurately determine the value of contractual just cause protection").
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Kim conducted two important empirical studies of workers' knowl-
edge of their legal rights. Kim demonstrated that workers typically
but "erroneously believe that the law affords them protection akin to
a just-cause contract, when in fact, they can be dismissed" without
notice or explanation.26 5 The widespread misunderstanding among
employees of their legal rights undermines the law and economics
defense of the at-will rule that assumes employers and employees
understand the nature of the at-will presumption.266 Interestingly,
Kim found that
virtually none of the factors that would be predicted, under
a rational actor model, to influence workers' legal knowl-
edge proved significant.... [F]actors such as past union
representation, prior responsibility for hiring and firing
other employees, the experience of being fired, and general
work force experience did not appear to influence the level
of a respondent's legal knowledge.267
Perhaps even more interesting, in the context of my argument
about the at-will rule's impact on disadvantaged groups, is Professor
Kim's further finding that Blacks are more likely than Whites to
265. Kim, supra note 22, at 447; see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining With
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in
an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105 (1997) (evidencing the fact that
workers are unaware of the legal rules applicable to the employment relation-
ship).
266. See Kim, supra note 22, at 450. Kim explains that defenders of the at-
will rule erroneously believe that
the [at-will] presumption merely operates as a default term, filling a
contractual gap in the face of the parties' silence. Thus, they take the
prevalence of at-will employment in the real world as evidence of its
desirability, noting that both employers and employees freely assent to
these arrangements in the vast majority of cases.
Id.
267. Id. at 452. Kim explains that the consistency of the mistaken under-
standing of the law's protections may be explained by the theory that
workers fail to distinguish norms and law. Holding strong beliefs
about fair play in the context of the employment relationship, they
mistakenly assume that these fairness norms governing employee dis-
charges coincide with legally enforceable rules. This confusion of
norms and law accounts for both the content and the persistence of
workers' mistaken beliefs about the law.
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think that they have greater job protection than they do.268 This is of
fundamental importance in a society in which African Americans as
a group are more likely than Whites to be fired from employment.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that African Americans are
even less likely than Whites to try to negotiate over the terms of em-
ployment and bargain in their own best interests. The result is a
systemic denial of the right to choose the type of employment rela-
tionship that safeguards them from unjust dismissal.
Professors Epstein, Verkerke, Posner, and others have argued
that, for the most part, at-will employment reflects the parties' de-
sires. That is, since there are no real impediments to vigorously ne-
gotiating out of the at-will presumption, then both employer and em-
ployee enter into the employment relationship with the intention of it
being at-will. Aside from Professor Kim's compelling evidence that
employees lack full knowledge about the legal rules governing em-
ployment, there are other reasons that this assumption may not nec-
essarily be valid. As Professor Issacharoff explains, "[t]o a large
extent, then, whether the at-will rule evidences the desire of bar-
gaining parties must turn on the absence of structural barriers to ro-
bust negotiation. 2 69 In the face of structural obstacles to "robust ne-
gotiation," the intention of the parties may not be discemable from
the fact that they "choose" the at-will model. Professor Issacharoff
offers an apt analogy:
[T]he hiring stage is most like a first date between a po-
lygamist and a monogamist. The employer has entered into
a number of contemporaneous courtships such that there is
a diversification of the risk associated with any individual
affair. By contrast, the employee in a stable working rela-
tionship is restricted to faithful monogamy; .... [t]he em-
ployer is protected against employee shirking not only by
the capacity to discharge any particular employee, but by
the diminution of the consequences of any individual
shirking in a broader pool of employees. By contrast, the
employee's decision to accept one primary employment
268. See id. at 476-77 (discussing how race was a significant factor in how
one understood the at-will rule).
269. Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting For Employment: The Limited Return
of the Common Law, 74 ThX. L. REv. 1783, 1794 (1996).
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forecloses the ability to earn service credits with other em-
ployers. Moreover, the employer generally is able to dic-
tate terms of employment and has unilateral access to in-
formation about the long-term financial condition of the
firm. The employee has only a limited capacity to directly
address her concern about long-term prospects with the firm
without signalling [sic] concern that she may be a lag-
gard.
270
Several scholars have convincingly argued that replacing the at-
will presumption with a just-cause default rule is more fair and there-
fore desirable. Justifications for a just-cause standard fall along a
spectrum, but most involve the understanding that so long as em-
ployees perform their duties satisfactorily, they should not be dis-
missed unless there is just cause for termination.27' The importance
of job security is illustrated by the fact that virtually all collective
bargaining agreements provide for some sort of protection against
arbitrary dismissals, and even when they do not, judges have been
willing to readjust-cause principles into the agreement.
From the perspective of the employer, a just-cause standard in
employment relations may actually safeguard companies from the
personal biases and whims of its managers. It may be that some of
those in positions to dismiss employees are not always motivated by
concern for the company or the well-being of other employees. Re-
tention of good workers ultimately benefits the company. Requiring
managers to justify the termination would discourage them from
dismissing good workers for irrational reasons without unduly ham-
pering the company's ability to rid itself of poor employees. Given
the time, expense, and emotional toil of bringing an action against a
company, the hope is that a poorly performing employee would rec-
ognize her culpability in the discharge and end the matter without
engaging in time consuming arbitration or expensive litigation. On
the other hand, a company may be more likely to settle a claim if it
270. Id. at 1795.
271. See Abrams & Nolan, supra note 27, at 601 (explaining that just cause
"embodies the idea that the employee is entitled to continued employment,
provided he attends work regularly, obeys work rules, performs at some rea-
sonable level of quality and quantity, and refrains from interfering with his
employer's business by his activities on or off thejob").
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were discovered that the firing was done unfairly. Undoubtedly,
some employees will use the administrative or judicial system to
bring vexatious suits for wrongful dismissal, but many of these suits
will be settled early on by attorneys who determine that the suit lacks
merit or through other mechanisms of dispute resolution. Given the
inherently unequal positions of employee and employer, the greater
injustice would be to deprive a good worker of the opportunity to de-
fend her position because of the expense of bringing an action or lack
of informational and economic resources.
In contrast to those who see the employment relationship as
fundamentally an economic one, I believe that the law must provide
protection against unjust or arbitrary termination in recognition of
the personal and psychological significance of work for the em-
ployee. As Professor Cornell has explained,
[t]o force the employer to give me reasons for my termina-
tion is to force him or her to recognize me as a human being
whose identity is fundamentally tied up with my work. The
personal humiliation caused by individual firing is well-
documented. An essential aspect of the humiliation is one's
feelings of being erased as an individual.272
Requiring reasons, therefore, does something to address the psychic
damage of the dismissal.273 When the dismissal is ultimately pre-
cipitated by the employee's race or gender, then a just-cause re-
quirement provides a level of protection to working people of color
and women who might otherwise be left without redress.
Having outlined the arguments for a "just-cause" standard, the
argument set forth in this Article differs from these traditional argu-
ments.274 Placing the experience of groups disadvantaged by race or
272. Cornell, supra note 4, at 1620.
273. According to Cornell:
Of course, to merely give reasons for the firing cannot completely take
away that harm. What it does is recognize just how important work is
to personality. It demands that a firing be seen as the serious assault
on personality that it is. To impose this harm without reasons is to
belittle the damage done.
Id. at 1614-15.
274. See Abrams & Nolan, supra note 27; Estlund, supra note 17, at 1667-68
(stating that at-will employment has a large disparity in the amount of bar-
gaining power between the parties); Kim, supra note 22, at 506-07 (basing her
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sex at the center of the discussion, I suggest that since the rule erro-
neously presumes equality in employer and employee bargaining
strength, since people of color are more likely than Whites to be in-
voluntarily released from their jobs, since women are more likely
than men to be employed at-will, and since the harsh effects of the
rule are reinforced by the failure of antidiscrimination laws to ad-
dress most instances of employment discrimination, the at-will rule
must be replaced by a default rule that requires the employer to pro-
vide notice or pay in lieu of notice before discharging an employee.
This Article disagrees with those who suggest that a just-cause stan-
dard is sufficiently protective of employee interests. A just-cause
standard has not provided sufficient protection against involuntary
separations for African American and indigenous workers in the fed-
eral sector. Moreover, after the Hicks275 decision, defensible reasons
for discharging an employee are almost always available to an em-
ployer. Thus, it is not clear how requiring just-cause for discharge
will ultimately protect workers who have been discriminated against
in ways not detectable by the law.
The courts' continued adherence to the at-will rule reflects as-
sumptions that employees and employers are equal in bargaining
power and that employers in general do not make irrational or ineffi-
cient employment decisions or discriminatory decisions based on
classifications such as race, sex, or sexual orientation. If this were
so, then perhaps a system that treats both employer and employee
equally would not be problematic. Making these assumptions, and
given my suggestion that discharge must be preceded by a period of
notice, it follows that an employee would likewise be obligated to
give notice to an employer upon the employee's voluntary termina-
tion of employment. However, if one "de-marginalizes" the em-
ployment experience of people of color and women and places these
at the center of one's analysis, one sees that there is widespread dis-
crimination with which antidiscrimination law is ill-equipped to deal.
Consequently, abandoning the at-will doctrine in favor of a require-
ment that employers provide notice would alleviate at least some of
conclusion on workers' understandings of what the law should be); McGinley,
supra note 27; Schwab, supra note 27; Summers, Worker Dislocation, supra
note 61.
275. St Mary's Honor Court v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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the harsh consequences of at-will employment. If this is the case,
then a theory of employment that treats the decisions of employer
and employee the same is suspect. In other words, symmetrical
treatment of employer and employee decisions to abandon the em-
ployment relationship would perpetuate inequality. Therefore, only
the employer should be required to provide notice. Many models or
approaches are available to state legislatures, but at the very least, a
notice requirement is warranted if only to provide marginally more
monetary protection against discriminatory dismissals of workers of
color.
An elaboration of the precise workings of a notice system must
by necessity be left for legislatures to determine. However, using
Canadian legislation as a model, it should be recommended that for
every month of service, the employee is due a legislatively deter-
mined period of notice or amount of pay in lieu of notice-for exam-
ple, one month's notice for each year of employment. Since subor-
dinated groups are less likely to be long-term employees entitled to
substantial periods of notice, the amount of notice should perhaps be
linked to factors in addition to length of employment. For example,
courts should offer protection to early career workers who have in-
curred some substantial cost in accepting a new job.276 This re-
quirement would extend to all public and private employers em-
ploying a certain minimum number of employees-for example,
fifteen employees as per Title VII.27 7 This minimum number re-
quirement protects very small businesses. In order not to adversely
effect "start-up ' 278 companies, the requirement of notice may kick in
after a certain amount of time, for example, after six months of con-
tinuous employment. Employers would still be free to dismiss work-
ers for good cause, and what constitutes good cause should be legis-
latively defined. It might be objected that requiring notice in cases
where there is no cause for discharge may itself create an incentive
for employers to lie about the reasons for discharge. If an employer
knows that it is liable to pay wages in lieu of notice any time it
276. THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW:
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW 49 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
277. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to -17 (1994).
278. See Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L., Spring 1998, at 99, 108 (defining start-up companies).
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discharges an employee without reason, then it will be beneficial for
the employer to fabricate reasons for the discharge so as to avoid the
requirement of paying wages in lieu of notice. To counter this ob-
jection, the notice requirement must be accompanied by a mecha-
nism that curbs the employer's incentive to manufacture reasons for
dismissal. Therefore, an administrative system that allows employ-
ees to complain about an employer's failure to provide sufficient no-
tice would have to place on the employer the burden of establishing
reasons for dismissal.279
This Article would not go so far as to require employers to jus-
tify the discharge of an employee before an employee can be dis-
charged.280 Perhaps requiring an employer to submit reasons to a
government agency using a standard form or requiring employers to
keep on file the reasons for discharge would, though only a minor
burden on the employer, nonetheless discourage fabrication of rea-
sons for discharge. The state departments of labor would then have a
means of studying discharge rates providing relevant data on dis-
missals. Individual acts of discrimination might not be detected, but
a pattern of dismissals that affects groups on the basis of racial or
gender characterizations might be found. There are some models for
these record-keeping requirements that can be assessed and fash-
ioned for this particular purpose. Much of this information is already
required by state and federal employment statutes.28  The ultimate
goal of such a system, however, is not to punish employers, but to
protect workers from frivolous or discriminatory dismissals.
Obviously, a legislative scheme would have to be developed in
more detail than can be offered in this Article. However, several
factors must be addressed in any legislative proposal requiring em-
ployers to provide notice. First, under this scheme, the workplace
would be subject to more governmental scrutiny, and employers will
resist this. However, providing notice to employees may in fact
279. See Issacharoft supra note 269, at 1808 (arguing for a no-fault sever-
ance scheme in which an administrative tribunal would decide whether the
employer meets its burden of establishing the grounds for termination that
"justify the discharge based on incompetence or shirking").
280. See id. at 1809 (stating that this requirement exists in some European
countries).
281. For example, under the FLSA, Title VII, and OSHA, employers are re-
quired to keep records of wages and hours, hazardous conditions, etc.
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result in fewer discrimination charges being brought against employ-
ers, thus reducing employers' cost of defending themselves against
discrimination charges. In fact, law and economic scholars who are
generally in favor of preserving at-will employment may find a man-
datory notice scheme desirable. As Dianne Avery has explained,
even though government intervention in the market is gen-
erally anathema to law and economics scholars, [mandatory
notice] might have some appeal to them. ... For example,
a mandatory notice rule would have certain efficiencies be-
cause it would reduce transaction costs in bargaining for
severance pay. Because the psychological and other per-
sonal harms of involuntary separation are so difficult to
quantify, and are generally not taken into account in dis-
charges, a mandatory notice rule would internalize these
costs in a regular and predictable way that could be passed
on to consumers. 82
Second, the relationship between mandatory notice and state un-
employment schemes would have to be examined. For the most part,
unemployment legislation is not designed to fully compensate work-
ers. A notice requirement would supplement the existing unem-
ployment scheme. Again, Canada may provide an appropriate model
since its unemployment scheme was developed alongside its com-
mon-law notice requirement. Third, employers' right to discharge
for shirking or misconduct must be preserved. A system that would
require employers to retain poor workers is obviously not desirable,
but neither is the current system that allows for the discriminatory
discharge of workers of color under the guise of employment at-will.
And finally, there is a danger that antidiscrimination law might be
undermined if discharged employees fail to challenge discriminatory
or mixed motive discharges because they are mollified by the notice
or pay that they receive. 83 One would hope, however, that those
who are victims of unlawful discrimination are sufficiently motivated
to bring actions. In fact, since income has much to do with whether
individuals file discrimination charges in the first place, it may be
that with the money they receive from mandatory notice periods,
282. Letter from Dianne Avery, supra note 195, at 4.
283. See id. at3.
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discharged employees are more financially capable of pursuing dis-
crimination charges under a mandatory notice scheme. Clearly, a
mandatory notice scheme must never be designed to replace our an-
tidiscrimination laws. What is needed, however, is a simultaneous
strengthening of antidiscrimination laws to identify and address dis-
criminatory practices that have so far eluded enforcement.
X. CONCLUSION
The employment at-will doctrine is part of a legal system which
tolerates overconsumption by the wealthy and dire poverty284 even
among working men and women,285 betraying the American promise
of social equality.286 In the United States, conspicuous inequality is
the norm. 287 Inequality between rich and poor,28s men and women,
284. See A PROFILE OF THE WORKING POOR, supra note 113 ("In 1996, 36.5
million persons, 13.7 percent of the population, lived at or below the official
poverty level.")
285. In 1996, "7.4 million people were classified as 'working poor,"' defined
as
individuals who spent at least 27 weeks in the labor force (working or
looking for work), but whose income fell below the official poverty
threshold .... In 1996, nearly 4.1 million fimilies lived below the
poverty level despite having at least one member in the labor market
for 27 weeks or more.
Id.
286. See id. Moreover, in 1996,
[a]lthough nearly three-fourths of the working poor were [W]hite
workers, [B]lack and Hispanic workers continued to experience pov-
erty rates that were more than twice the rates of [W]hites. White
working women and men in the labor force... were about equally
likely to be poor. By contrast, [B]lack working women had a poverty
rate of 14.2 percent-almost twice the rate of [B]lack working men
(8.6 percent).
Id.
287. See MACKINNON, supra note 240, at 1. According to MacKinnon:
equality among human beings is commonly affirmed but rarely prac-
ticed. As a principle, it can be fiercely loved, passionately sought,
highly vaunted, sentimentally assumed, complacently taken for
granted, and legally guaranteed. Its open detractors are few. Yet de-
spite general consensus on equality as a value, no society is organized
on equality principles. As a result, few lives are lived in equality,
even in democracies. As a fect, social equality is hard to find any-
where. Social inequality, by contrast, is seldom defined but widely
practiced.
January 2001]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW
people of color and Whites-not only economic inequality, but also
inequality of access to education, health and dependant care, and to
safe and healthy work environments-contradicts the commitment to
individualism and social equality in American legal culture as re-
flected in the at-will doctrine. The at-will doctrine was developed at
a time when the law tolerated-and in some cases required-dis-
criminatory treatment based on race and gender. Today, the law re-
quires a gender- or color-blind approach. Yet, the doctrine persists
in its failure to address the systemic reality of subordination and eco-
nomic exploitation. A fairer approach to employment relations is
needed.
This Article contributes to the at-will critique by arguing for the
wholesale rejection of the doctrine in favor of a notice requirement.
This argument is informed by a critique of "formal equality" devel-
oped in feminist jurisprudence, critical race theory, and Canadian
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which recognize that the parties to an
employment contract are seldom "equal." By examining employ-
ment at-will in light of this critique, one must conclude that its for-
mal equality underpinnings produce unfair or unequal treatment of
most workers and, in particular, place women, people of color, gays,
and lesbians in an even weaker bargaining power vis-A-vis employ-
ers.
In employment at-will arrangements, the ever-present possibility
of discharge undermines the sense of security that employees hope to
gain from employment.289 The decline in the rate of unionization has
meant that "state courts and legislatures have become the protectors
Id.
288. See AMOTT & MATTHEI, supra note 69, at 23. According to Amott and
Matthei,
In 1986, the super-rich (the richest one-half of one percent of the
households) owned 35% of the total wealth in our country, over sev-
enty times the share they would have had if wealth were equally dis-
tributed. The richest tenth of all households owned 72% of all wealth,
over seven times their fair share. At the other end of the hierarchy, in
1986, the poorest 90% of households owned only 28% of total wealth,
and had to send at least one household member out to work for the
household's survival.
Id.
289. This anxiety is especially pronounced in situations of long-term em-
ployment.
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of the individual employee., 290 Recognizing the growing complexity
of employment related issues, state legislatures and courts have en-
hanced protections for individual workers against discriminatory or
retaliatory discharge. The harshness of the at-will rule is firther
softened by common-law remedies available under tort and contract
theories. However, the costs of litigating "wrongful discharge" cases
are often prohibitive for both employee and employer.29' It is even
more so for women and people of color who are already disadvan-
taged vis-a-vis nonminority employees and employers. Furthermore,
in some states, for example in New York, the tort of wrongful dis-
charge has not been judicially recognized and successful litigation
under breach of contract is difficult to achieve. The common law in
such states offers very little practical protection against arbitrary
dismissal for an at-will employee.
Nonetheless, there are those who suggest that it is precisely be-
cause the United States provides fewer protections for its workers
than do other countries that it is able to maintain its economic and
political superiority throughout the world. Thomas Friedman, for
example, argues that Europe is less technologically advanced than
the United States because of Europe's liberal labor laws and because
of the relative conservatism of the U.S. approach to labor relations.
He says, "the Europeans have moved slower because their rigid labor
laws make it very hard, or very costly, to lay off workers. And if you
have to pay for a new computer and the wages of an old worker, you
are much less likely to buy the new computer."292 It follows then, on
290. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The
Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective
Bargaining System, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 575, 591 (1992).
291. See Summers, Worker Dislocation, supra note 61, at 1039 (stating that
employees bear the burden of costs associated with loss of jobs, whereas em-
ployers bear little or no cost).
292. Thomas L. Friedman, An American in Paris, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1999, at A21. In addition, Friedman argues:
The most important thing Mr. Reagan did was break the 1981 air taf-
fic controllers' strike, which helped break the hold of organized labor
over the U.S. economy. That was critically important for spurring the
information revolution in America. How so? Ask yourself this: Why
is it that the Europeans have lots of money and the same access to
technology as Americans do, yet most of them have been slow to ab-
sorb computers and info-technologies? Answer U.S. companies are
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his analysis, that any increased job security protections for workers
in the United States would result in a decline in American techno-
logical superiority. Similarly, some might argue that this proposal
that the default rule be changed from the at-will presumption to a
notice requirement would exacerbate the flight of American jobs to
developing countries in a "race to the bottom.' 293 The fear is that if
American workers are given more protections against dismissal, then
American corporations will be more likely to open shop in nations
with fewer job protections for workers.294
My proposal that the at-will rule should be abolished requires
defending in light of these fears. I believe that job security ought to
be strengthened for American workers so as to bring U.S. industrial
regulation in line with protections offered in other industrialized na-
tions. Replacing the at-will rule with a legislative scheme requiring
notice of termination, would probably have a negligible effect on the
corporation's decisions to relocate outside the United States. Recent
scholarship suggests that raising productivity in order to compete ef-
fectively in international markets requires increasing job security.295
In an era of globalization wherein corporate interests often result in
quick to absorb new, more productive technologies because they can
easily absorb the cost of the new investment by laying off the workers
who used to perform that task. And as the overall economy becomes
more productive, those workers get rehired elsewhere.
Id.
293. Mark Barenberg, Law and Labor in the New Global Economy: Through
the Lens of United States Federalism, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 448
(1995) (defining the race to the bottom as "movement of capital from high-
wage economies to low-wage economies"); see also Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational La-
bor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 992 (1995) (explaining that global-
ization increases "the flight of capital to areas with lower regulatory stan-
dards").
294. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 290, at 585 (noting that the more suc-
cessful unions are making legislative changes, the more likely companies are
to move out of the country).
295. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with
Employee Supervision of Management, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1988)
(indicating that to the extent employees have a say in an organization, they are
more likely to invest in its future); Karl E. Klare, The Labor-Management Co-
operation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 39, 57-60 (1988) (suggesting that workplace cooperation benefits em-
ployers and employees).
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moving production to developing countries in search of conditions
that maximize profits, American workers are perhaps more vulner-
able to summary discharge than ever before. But perhaps the most
formidable problem with the at-will presumption is that it masks the
many illegitimate reasons for discharging an employee, including ra-
cism, sexism, and homophobia. This is all the more troubling in
light of studies suggesting disproportionate rates of firing of workers
of color.
With declining rates of unionization, the globalization of capital
and production, and the rise of arbitration agreements taking away
the individual worker's right to pursue discrimination claims in state
and federal courts, American workers are vulnerable to employer
tactics used to undermine employee bargaining strength. This is so
despite the judicial erosion of the at-will rule, recent plant closing
legislation, and preventative procedures and practices introduced by
companies in response to the possibility of wrongful discharge and
Title VII liability. Corporate due process mechanisms provide insuf-
ficient protection to employees at-will since they usually fail to pro-
vide impartial resolution of grievances and, more importantly, fail to
guarantee that dismissals will be for cause only.2 6 Moreover, ex-
ceptions to the at-will rule are only that-exceptions. Most legal de-
velopments protecting employees from arbitrary dismissal have
arisen through a piecemeal assortment of judicial pronouncements on
individual cases and through narrowly focused pieces of legislation.
The rule itself is inherently unworkable and should therefore be
abandoned.
This Article has deliberately focused on involuntary separation.
Discharge from employment is perhaps the most obvious harm that
the at-will doctrine does to workers. However, the doctrine inserts
itself into almost every aspect of the employment relationship,
through managerial prerogative and freedom of contract. At-will
employers are not typically required to provide employment benefits
such as sick leave, vacations, holidays, or medical insuranceS7 and,
for the most part, individual workers simply do not have the power to
influence the terms of the employment contract. This is not to say
296. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 1690.
297. See Summers, supra note 23, at 505.
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that employers have no incentives to provide certain benefits and
protections. For example, some have argued that employers who
treat their employees fairly will attract and retain better, more loyal
employees. However, that argument is based on the often erroneous
premise that employees have access to relevant information about a
prospective employer before entering into an employment relation-
ship. Doing away with the at-will presumption would have the effect
of establishing a different ethical and legal baseline for the treatment
of employees throughout the employment relationship. Its demise
would require that the law adopt a different framework for individual
contracts of employment. Given the declining rate of unionization, it
is prudent to provide greater job security for all workers since all
workers are entitled to protection from arbitrary, involuntary separa-
tion. And because antidiscrimination laws cannot be relied upon to
redress the myriad subtle, unconscious, or systemic discrimination
that people of color, women, and gays, and lesbians continue to ex-
perience, an employment law model that provides for notice or pay
in lieu of notice at the very least sends the message that human dig-
nity is worth protecting and that our law will not tolerate pretextual
discrimination in the guise of freedom of contract.
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